

High-bandwidth Digital Content Protection System

Mapping HDCP to HDMI

Revision 2.3

28 February, 2018

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1 Introduction

1.1 Scope

This specification describes the mapping of High-bandwidth Digital Content Protection (HDCP) system to HDMI, Revision 2.30.

For the purpose of this specification, it is assumed that the Audiovisual content is transmitted over a HDMI based wired display link. In an HDCP System, two or more HDCP Devices are interconnected through an HDCP-protected Interface. The Audiovisual Content flows from the Upstream Content Control Function into the HDCP System at the most upstream HDCP Transmitter. From there the Audiovisual Content encrypted by the HDCP System, referred to as HDCP Content, flows through a tree-shaped topology of HDCP Receivers over HDCP-protected Interfaces. This specification describes a content protection mechanism for: (1) authentication of HDCP Receivers to their immediate upstream connection (i.e., an HDCP Transmitter), (2) revocation of HDCP Receivers that are determined by the Digital Content Protection, LLC, to be invalid, and (3) HDCP Encryption of Audiovisual Content over the HDCP-protected Interfaces between HDCP Transmitters and their downstream HDCP Receivers. HDCP Receivers may render the HDCP Content in audio and visual form for human consumption. HDCP Receivers may be HDCP Repeaters that serve as downstream HDCP Transmitters emitting the HDCP Content further downstream to one or more additional HDCP Receivers.

Unless otherwise specified, the term “HDCP Receiver” is also used to refer to the upstream HDCP-protected interface port of an HDCP Repeater. Similarly, the term “HDCP Transmitter” is also used to refer to the downstream HDCP-protected interface port of an HDCP Repeater. HDCP Transmitters must support HDCP Repeaters.

The state machines in this specification define the required behavior of HDCP Devices. The link-visible behavior of HDCP Devices implementing the specified state machines must be identical, even if implementations differ from the descriptions. The behavior of HDCP Devices implementing the specified state machines must also be identical from the perspective of an entity outside of the HDCP System.

Implementations must include all elements of the content protection system described herein, unless the element is specifically identified as informative or optional. Adopters must also ensure that implementations satisfy the robustness and compliance rules described in the HDCP License Agreement.

Device discovery and association, and link setup and teardown, is outside the scope of this specification.

1.2 Definitions

The following terminology, as used throughout this specification, is defined as herein:

Audiovisual Content. Audiovisual works (as defined in the United States Copyright Act as in effect on January 1, 1978), text and graphic images, are referred to as *AudioVisual Content*.

Authorized Device. An HDCP Device that is permitted access to HDCP Content is referred to as an *Authorized Device*. An HDCP Transmitter may test if a connected HDCP Receiver is an Authorized Device by successfully completing the following stages of the authentication protocol – Authentication and Key Exchange (AKE) and Locality check. If the authentication protocol successfully results in establishing authentication, then the other device is considered by the HDCP Transmitter to be an Authorized Device.

Content Stream. *Content Stream* consists of Audiovisual Content received from an Upstream Content Control Function that is to be encrypted and Audiovisual Content received from an Upstream Content Control Function that is encrypted by the HDCP System.

Device Key Set. An HDCP Receiver has a Device Key Set, which consists of its corresponding Device Secret Keys along with the associated Public Key Certificate.

Device Secret Keys. For an HDCP Transmitter, Device Secret Key consists of the secret Global Constant. For an HDCP Receiver, Device Secret Keys consists of the secret Global Constant and the RSA private key. The Device Secret Keys are to be protected from exposure outside of the HDCP Device.

downstream. The term, *downstream*, is used as an adjective to refer to being towards the sink of the HDCP Content. For example, when an HDCP Transmitter and an HDCP Receiver are connected over an HDCP-protected Interface, the HDCP Receiver can be referred to as the *downstream* HDCP Device in this connection. For another example, on an HDCP Repeater, the HDCP-protected Interface Port(s) which can emit HDCP Content can be referred to as its *downstream* HDCP-protected Interface Port(s). See also, *upstream*.

Enhanced Encryption Status Signaling (EESS). *EESS*, further described in Section 3.3, is a protocol for signaling whether encryption is enabled or disabled for a frame.

frame. For purposes of the HDCP specification, a frame consists of the pixel data between vertical synchronization signals. HDCP may be used with both progressive and interlaced video formats. For interlaced video, every field is an HDCP frame.

Global Constant. A 128-bit random, secret constant provided only to HDCP adopters and used during HDCP Content encryption or decryption

HDCP 1.x. *HDCP 1.x* refers to, specifically, the variant of HDCP described by Revision 1.00 and higher versions along with their associated errata, if applicable.

HDCP 1.x-compliant Device. An HDCP Device that is designed in adherence to HDCP 1.x, defined above, is referred to as an *HDCP 1.x-compliant Device*.

HDCP 2. *HDCP 2* refers to, specifically, the variant of HDCP mapping for all HDCP protected interfaces described by Revision 2.00 and higher versions along with their associated errata, if applicable.

HDCP 2.0. *HDCP 2.0* refers to, specifically, the variant of HDCP mapping for all HDCP protected interfaces described by Revision 2.00 of the corresponding specifications along with their associated errata, if applicable.

HDCP 2.0-compliant Device. An HDCP Device that is designed in adherence to HDCP 2.0 is referred to as an *HDCP 2.0-compliant Device*.

HDCP 2.3. *HDCP 2.3* refers to, specifically, the variant of HDCP mapping described by Revision 2.30 of this specification along with its associated errata, if applicable.

HDCP 2.3-compliant Device. An HDCP Device that is designed in adherence to HDCP 2.3 is referred to as an *HDCP 2.3-compliant Device*.

HDCP Cipher. The HDCP encryption module consisting of a 128-bit AES module that is operated in a Counter (CTR) mode is referred to as *HDCP Cipher*.

HDCP Content. *HDCP Content* consists of Audiovisual Content that is protected by the HDCP System. *HDCP Content* includes the Audiovisual Content in encrypted form as it is transferred from an HDCP Transmitter to an HDCP Receiver over an HDCP-protected Interface, as well as any translations of the same content, or portions thereof. For avoidance of doubt, Audiovisual Content that is never encrypted by the HDCP System is not *HDCP Content*.

HDCP Device. Any device that contains one or more HDCP-protected Interface Port and is designed in adherence to HDCP is referred to as an *HDCP Device*.

HDCP Encryption. *HDCP Encryption* is the encryption technology of HDCP when applied to the protection of HDCP Content in an HDCP System.

HDCP Receiver. An HDCP Device that can receive and decrypt HDCP Content through one or more of its HDCP-protected Interface Ports is referred to as an *HDCP Receiver*.

HDCP Repeater. An HDCP Device that can receive and decrypt HDCP Content through one or more of its HDCP-protected Interface Ports, and can also re-encrypt and emit said HDCP Content through one or more of its HDCP-protected Interface Ports, is referred to as an *HDCP Repeater*. An *HDCP Repeater* may also be referred to as either an HDCP Receiver or an HDCP Transmitter when referring to either the upstream side or the downstream side, respectively.

HDCP Session. An *HDCP Session* is established between an HDCP Transmitter and HDCP Receiver with the transmission or reception of the authentication initiation message, AKE_Init. The established HDCP Session remains valid until it is aborted by the HDCP Transmitter or a new HDCP Session is established, which invalidates the HDCP Session that was previously established, by the transmission or reception of a new AKE_Init message.

HDCP System. An *HDCP System* consists of an HDCP Transmitter, zero or more HDCP Repeaters and one or more HDCP Receivers connected through their HDCP-protected interfaces in a tree topology; whereas the said HDCP Transmitter is the HDCP Device most upstream, and receives the Audiovisual Content from one or more Upstream Content Control Functions. All HDCP Devices connected to other HDCP Devices in an *HDCP System* over HDCP-protected Interfaces are part of the *HDCP System*.

HDCP Transmitter. An HDCP Device that can encrypt and emit HDCP Content through one or more of its HDCP-protected Interface Ports is referred to as an *HDCP Transmitter*.

HDCP. *HDCP* is an acronym for High-bandwidth Digital Content Protection. This term refers to this content protection system as described by any revision of this specification and its errata.

HDCP_HPD (HDCP Hot Plug Detect). For HDCP1.0, HDCP1.1, HDCP1.2, HDCP1.3 devices, hot plug detection is signaled by means of the physical Hot Plug Detect (HPD) line. HDCP1.4 and HDCP 2.2 or higher devices use the HDCP_HPD signal (or state) in place of the physical HPD line. For devices providing HDMI support for CP&EDID_HPD (Content Protection and EDID HPD) as specified in the HDMI1.4 specification, HDCP_HPD maps directly to the CP&EDID_HPD signal (or state) received from the HDMI logic. For devices not providing HDMI support for CP&EDID_HPD, HDCP_HPD maps directly to the physical HPD line.

HDCP-protected Interface Port. A connection point on an HDCP Device that supports an HDCP-protected Interface is referred to as an *HDCP-protected Interface Port*.

HDCP-protected Interface. An interface for which HDCP applies is described as an *HDCP-protected Interface*.

I²C Bus. A bus linking the HDCP Transmitter and HDCP Receiver compliant with the Video Electronics Standards Association (VESA) Digital Display Channel (DDC) specification as required by the HDMI Specification.

Master Key. A 128-bit random, secret cryptographic key negotiated between the HDCP Transmitter and the HDCP Receiver during Authentication and Key Exchange and used to pair the HDCP Transmitter with the HDCP Receiver.

Public Key Certificate. Each HDCP Receiver is issued a Public Key Certificate signed by DCP LLC, and contains the Receiver ID and RSA public key corresponding to the HDCP Receiver.

Receiver ID. A 40-bit value that uniquely identifies the HDCP Receiver. It has the same format as an HDCP 1.x KSV i.e. it contains 20 ones and 20 zeroes.

Session Key. A 128-bit random, secret cryptographic key negotiated between the HDCP Transmitter and the HDCP Receiver during Session Key exchange and used during HDCP Content encryption or decryption.

Upstream Content Control Function. The HDCP Transmitter most upstream in the HDCP System receives Audiovisual Content to be protected from the *Upstream Content Control Function*. The *Upstream Content Control Function* is not part of the HDCP System, and the methods used, if any, by the *Upstream Content Control Function* to determine for itself the HDCP System is correctly authenticated or permitted to receive the Audiovisual Content, or to transfer the Audiovisual Content to the HDCP System, are beyond the scope of this specification. On a personal computer platform, an example of an *Upstream Content Control Function* may be software designed to emit Audiovisual Content to a display or other presentation device that requires HDCP.

upstream. The term, *upstream*, is used as an adjective to refer to being towards the source of the HDCP Content. For example, when an HDCP Transmitter and an HDCP Receiver are connected over an HDCP-protected Interface, the HDCP Transmitter can be referred to as the *upstream* HDCP Device in this connection. For another example, on an HDCP Repeater, the HDCP-protected Interface Port(s) which can receive HDCP Content can be referred to as its *upstream* HDCP-protected Interface Port(s). See also, *downstream*.

1.3 Overview

1. HDCP is designed to protect the transmission of Audiovisual Content between an HDCP Transmitter and an HDCP Receiver. The HDCP Transmitter may support simultaneous connections to HDCP Receivers through one or more of its HDCP-protected interface ports. The system also allows for HDCP Repeaters that support downstream HDCP-protected Interface Ports. The HDCP System allows up to four levels of HDCP Repeaters and as many as 32 total HDCP Devices, including HDCP Repeaters, to be connected to an HDCP-protected Interface port.

Figure 1.1 illustrates an example connection topology for HDCP Devices.




Figure 1.1. Sample Connection Topology of an HDCP System

There are three elements of the content protection system. Each element plays a specific role in the system. First, there is the authentication protocol, through which the HDCP Transmitter verifies that a given HDCP Receiver is licensed to receive HDCP Content. The authentication protocol is implemented between the HDCP Transmitter and its corresponding downstream HDCP Receiver. With the legitimacy of the HDCP Receiver determined, encrypted HDCP Content is transmitted between the two devices based on shared secrets established during the authentication protocol. This prevents eavesdropping devices from utilizing the content. Finally, in the event that legitimate devices are compromised to permit unauthorized use of HDCP Content, renewability allows an HDCP Transmitter to identify such compromised devices and prevent the transmission of HDCP Content.

This document contains chapters describing in detail the requirements of each of these elements. In addition, a chapter is devoted to describing the cipher structure that is used in the encryption of HDCP Content.

1.4 Terminology

Throughout this specification, names that appear in *italic* refer to values that are exchanged during the HDCP cryptographic protocol. C-style notation is used throughout the state diagrams and protocol diagrams, although the logic functions AND, OR, and XOR are written out where a textual description would be more clear.

This specification uses the big-endian notation to represent bit strings so that the most significant bit in the representation is stored in the left-most bit position. The concatenation operator ‘||’ combines two values into one. For eight-bit values a and b , the result of $(a || b)$ is a 16-bit value, with the value a in the most significant eight bits and b in the least significant eight bits.

1.5 References

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2 Authentication Protocol

2.1 Overview

The HDCP authentication protocol is an exchange between an HDCP Transmitter and an HDCP Receiver that affirms to the HDCP Transmitter that the HDCP Receiver is authorized to receive HDCP Content. It is comprised of the following stages

- Authentication and Key Exchange (AKE) – The HDCP Receiver’s public key certificate is verified by the HDCP Transmitter. A Master Key k_m is exchanged.
- Locality Check – The HDCP Transmitter enforces locality on the content by requiring that the Round Trip Time (RTT) between a pair of messages is not more than 20 ms.
- Session Key Exchange (SKE) – The HDCP Transmitter exchanges Session Key k_s with the HDCP Receiver.
- Authentication with Repeaters – The step is performed by the HDCP Transmitter only with HDCP Repeaters. In this step, the repeater assembles downstream topology information and forwards it to the upstream HDCP Transmitter.

Successful completion of AKE and locality check stages affirms to the HDCP Transmitter that the HDCP Receiver is authorized to receive HDCP Content. At the end of the authentication protocol, a communication path is established between the HDCP Transmitter and HDCP Receiver that only Authorized Devices can access.

All HDCP Devices contain a 128-bit secret Global Constant denoted by lc_{128} . All HDCP Devices share the same Global Constant. lc_{128} is provided only to HDCP adopters.

The HDCP Transmitter contains the 3072-bit RSA public key of DCP LLC denoted by $kpub_{dcp}$.

The HDCP Receiver is issued 1024-bit RSA public and private keys. The public key is stored in a Public Key Certificate issued by DCP LLC, denoted by $cert_{rx}$. Table 2.1 gives the fields contained in the certificate. All values are stored in big-endian format.

| Name | Size (bits) | Bit position | Function |
|---------------------|-------------|--------------|--|
| Receiver ID | 40 | 4175:4136 | Unique receiver identifier. It has the same format as an HDCP 1.x KSV i.e. it contains 20 ones and 20 zeroes |
| Receiver Public Key | 1048 | 4135:3088 | Unique RSA public key of HDCP Receiver denoted by $kpub_{rx}$. The first 1024 bits is the big-endian representation of the modulus n and the trailing 24 bits is the big-endian representation of the public exponent e |
| Reserved2 | 4 | 3087:3084 | Reserved for future definition. Must be 0x0 or 0x1. |
| Reserved1 | 12 | 3083:3072 | Reserved for future definition. Must be 0x000 |
| DCP LLC Signature | 3072 | 3071:0 | A cryptographic signature calculated over all preceding fields of the certificate. RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 is the signature scheme used as defined by PKCS #1 V2.1: RSA Cryptography Standard. SHA-256 is the underlying hash function |

Table 2.1. Public Key Certificate of HDCP Receiver

The secret RSA private key is denoted by $kpriv_{rx}$. The computation time of RSA private key operation can be reduced by using the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) technique. Therefore, it is recommended that HDCP Receivers use the CRT technique for private key computations.

2.2 Authentication and Key Exchange

Authentication and Key Exchange (AKE) is the first step in the authentication protocol. Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 illustrates the AKE. The HDCP Transmitter (*Device A*) can initiate authentication at any time, even before a previous authentication exchange has completed. The HDCP Transmitter initiates a new HDCP Session by sending the authentication initiation message, *AKE_Init*. Message formats are defined in Section 4.2.




Figure 2.1. Authentication and Key Exchange (Without Stored k_m)




Figure 2.2. Authentication and Key Exchange (With Stored k_m)

The HDCP Transmitter

- Initiates authentication by sending the initiation message, `AKE_Init`, containing a 64-bit pseudo-random value (r_{tx}) and `TxCaps` parameters.
- Reads `AKE_Send_Cert` from the receiver containing $cert_{rx}$, a 64-bit pseudo-random value (r_{rx}) and `RxCaps`. `REPEATER` bit in `RxCaps` indicates whether the connected receiver is an HDCP Repeater. If `REPEATER` is set to one, it indicates the receiver is an HDCP Repeater. If `REPEATER` is zero, the receiver is not an HDCP Repeater. The `AKE_Send_Cert` message must be available for the transmitter to read within 100 ms from the time the transmitter finishes writing the `AKE_Init` message parameters to the HDCP Receiver. If the `AKE_Send_Cert` message is not available for the transmitter to read within 100 ms, the transmitter aborts the authentication protocol.
- Extracts *Receiver ID* from $cert_{rx}$
 - If the HDCP Transmitter does not have a 128-bit Master Key k_m stored corresponding to the *Receiver ID* (See Section 2.2.1)
 - Verifies the signature on the certificate using $k_{pub_{dcp}}$. Failure of signature verification constitutes an authentication failure and the HDCP Transmitter aborts the authentication protocol.
 - Generates a pseudo-random 128-bit Master Key k_m . Encrypts k_m with $k_{pub_{rx}}$ ($E_{k_{pub}}(k_m)$) and sends `AKE_No_Stored_km` message to the receiver containing the 1024-bit $E_{k_{pub}}(k_m)$. RSAES-OAEP encryption scheme must be used as defined by PKCS #1 V2.1: RSA Cryptography Standard. SHA-256 is the underlying hash function. The mask generation function used is MGF1 which uses SHA-256 as its underlying hash function.
 - Verifies integrity of the System Renewability Message (SRM). It does this by checking the signature of the SRM using $k_{pub_{dcp}}$. Failure of this integrity check constitutes an authentication failure and causes the HDCP Transmitter to abort authentication protocol.

The top-level HDCP Transmitter checks to see if the *Receiver ID* of the connected device is found in the revocation list. If the *Receiver ID* of the connected HDCP Device is found in the revocation list, authentication fails and the authentication protocol is aborted. SRM integrity check and revocation check are performed only by the top-level HDCP Transmitter.

- Performs key derivation as explained in Section 2.7 to generate 256-bit k_d . $k_d = dkey_0 \parallel dkey_1$, where $dkey_0$ and $dkey_1$ are derived keys generated when $ctr = 0$ and $ctr = 1$ respectively. $dkey_0$ and $dkey_1$ are in big-endian order.
- Computes 256-bit $H = \text{HMAC-SHA256}(r_{tx} \parallel RxCaps \parallel TxCaps, k_d)$ where `HMAC-SHA256` is computed over $r_{tx} \parallel RxCaps \parallel TxCaps$ and the key used for HMAC is k_d .
- Reads the `AKE_Send_H_prime` message from the receiver containing the 256-bit H' . The `AKE_Send_H_prime` message must be available for the transmitter to read within one second from the time the transmitter finishes writing the `AKE_No_Stored_km` message parameters to the HDCP Receiver. If the `AKE_Send_H_prime`

message is not available for the transmitter to read within one second or there is a mismatch between H and H' , the transmitter aborts the authentication protocol.

- If the HDCP Transmitter has a 128-bit Master Key k_m stored corresponding to the *Receiver ID* (See Section 2.2.1)
 - Sends AKE_Stored_km message to the receiver with the 128-bit $E_{kh}(k_m)$ and the 128-bit m corresponding to the *Receiver ID* of the HDCP Receiver
 - Verifies integrity of the System Renewability Message (SRM). It does this by checking the signature of the SRM using $k_{pub_{dep}}$. Failure of this integrity check constitutes an authentication failure and causes the HDCP Transmitter to abort the authentication protocol.

The top-level HDCP Transmitter checks to see if the *Receiver ID* of the connected device is found in the revocation list. If the *Receiver ID* of the connected HDCP Device is found in the revocation list, authentication fails and the authentication protocol is aborted.

- Performs key derivation as explained in Section 2.7 to generate 256-bit k_d . $k_d = dkey_0 \parallel dkey_1$, where $dkey_0$ and $dkey_1$ are derived keys generated when $ctr = 0$ and $ctr = 1$ respectively. $dkey_0$ and $dkey_1$ are in big-endian order.
- Computes 256-bit $H = \text{HMAC-SHA256}(r_{tx} \parallel RxCaps \parallel TxCaps, k_d)$ where HMAC-SHA256 is computed over $r_{tx} \parallel RxCaps \parallel TxCaps$ and the key used for HMAC is k_d .
- Reads the AKE_Send_H_prime message from the receiver containing the 256-bit H' . The AKE_Send_H_prime message must be available for the transmitter to read within 200 ms from the time the transmitter finishes writing the AKE_Stored_km message parameters to the HDCP Receiver. If the AKE_Send_H_prime message is not available for the transmitter to read within 200 ms or there is a mismatch between H and H' , the transmitter aborts the authentication protocol.

The HDCP Receiver

- Makes available the AKE_Send_Cert message for the transmitter to read in response to AKE_Init. The AKE_Send_Cert message must be available for the transmitter to read within 100 ms from the time the transmitter finishes writing the AKE_Init message parameters to the HDCP Receiver.
- If AKE_No_Stored_km is received, the HDCP Receiver
 - Decrypts k_m with $k_{priv_{rx}}$ using RSAES-OAEP decryption scheme.
 - Performs key derivation as explained in Section 2.7 to generate 256-bit k_d . $k_d = dkey_0 \parallel dkey_1$, where $dkey_0$ and $dkey_1$ are derived keys generated when $ctr = 0$ and $ctr = 1$ respectively. $dkey_0$ and $dkey_1$ are in big-endian order.
 - Computes $H' = \text{HMAC-SHA256}(r_{tx} \parallel RxCaps \parallel TxCaps, k_d)$. The AKE_Send_H_prime message must be available for the transmitter to read

within one second from the time the transmitter finishes writing the AKE_No_Stored_km message parameters to the HDCP Receiver.

- If AKE_Stored_km is received, the HDCP Receiver
 - Computes 128-bit $k_h = \text{SHA-256}(k_{\text{priv}_{rx}})[127:0]$
 - Decrypts $E_{k_h}(k_m)$ using AES with the received m as input and k_h as key in to the AES module as illustrated in Figure 2.3 to derive k_m .
 - Performs key derivation as explained in Section 2.7 to generate 256-bit k_d . $k_d = \text{dkey}_0 \parallel \text{dkey}_1$, where dkey_0 and dkey_1 are derived keys generated when $\text{ctr} = 0$ and $\text{ctr} = 1$ respectively. dkey_0 and dkey_1 are in big-endian order.
 - Computes $H' = \text{HMAC-SHA256}(r_{tx} \parallel RxCaps \parallel TxCaps, k_d)$. The AKE_Send_H_prime message must be available for the transmitter to read within 200 ms from the time the transmitter finishes writing the AKE_Stored_km message parameters to the HDCP Receiver.

On a decryption failure of k_m with $k_{\text{priv}_{rx}}$, the HDCP Receiver does not send H' and simply lets the timeout occur on the HDCP Transmitter.

2.2.1 Pairing

To speed up the AKE process, pairing must be implemented between the HDCP Transmitter and HDCP Receiver in parallel with AKE. When AKE_No_Stored_km message is received from the transmitter, it is an indication to the receiver that the transmitter does not have k_m stored corresponding to the receiver. In this case, after computing H' , the HDCP Receiver

- Computes 128-bit $k_h = \text{SHA-256}(k_{\text{priv}_{rx}})[127:0]$.
- Generates 128-bit $E_{k_h}(k_m)$ by encrypting k_m with k_h using AES as illustrated in Figure 2.3.
- Makes the AKE_Send_Pairing_Info message containing the 128-bit $E_{k_h}(k_m)$ available for the transmitter to read. This message must be available for the transmitter to read within 200 ms from the time the transmitter begins reading the AKE_Send_H_prime message parameters from the HDCP Receiver.

If the AKE_Send_Pairing_Info message is not available for the transmitter to read within 200 ms, authentication fails and the transmitter aborts the authentication protocol. On reading AKE_Send_Pairing_Info message, the HDCP Transmitter may persistently store m (which is r_{tx} concatenated with $r_{rx}(r_{tx} \parallel r_{rx})$), k_m and $E_{k_h}(k_m)$ along with *Receiver ID*

Note: The HDCP Transmitter may store in its non-volatile storage m , k_m and $E_{k_h}(k_m)$ along with corresponding *Receiver IDs* of all HDCP Receivers with which pairing was implemented by the HDCP Transmitter.

Figure 2.3 illustrates the encryption of k_m with k_h .




Figure 2.3. $E_{k_h}(k_m)$ Computation

128-bit m is constructed by concatenating r_{tx} and r_{rx} ($r_{tx} || r_{rx}$). Both values are in big-endian order.

2.3 Locality Check

Locality check is performed after AKE and pairing. The HDCP Transmitter initiates locality check by sending a 64-bit pseudo-random nonce r_n to the downstream receiver.

The HDCP Transmitter

- Initiates locality check by writing the LC_Init message containing a 64-bit pseudo-random nonce r_n to the HDCP Receiver.
- Sets its watchdog timer to 20 ms. The LC_Send_L_prime message must be received by the transmitter within 20 ms from the time the transmitter finishes writing the LC_Init message parameters to the HDCP Receiver. Locality check fails if the watchdog timer expires before the last byte of the LC_Send_L_prime message is received by the transmitter. The transmitter then aborts the authentication protocol.
- Computes $L = \text{HMAC-SHA256}(r_n, k_d \text{ XOR } r_{rx})$ where HMAC-SHA256 is computed over r_n and the key used for HMAC is $k_d \text{ XOR } r_{rx}$, where r_{rx} is XORed with the least-significant 64-bits of k_d .
- On reading LC_Send_L_prime message from the receiver, compares L and L' . Locality check fails if L is not equal to L' .

An HDCP Repeater initiates locality check on all its downstream HDCP-protected interface ports by sending unique r_n values to the connected HDCP Devices.

Figure 2.4 illustrate locality check between the HDCP Transmitter and HDCP Receiver.




Figure 2.4. Locality Check between HDCP Transmitter and HDCP Receiver

The HDCP Receiver

- Computes a 256-bit value $L' = \text{HMAC-SHA256}(r_n, k_d \text{ XOR } r_{rx})$.
- Makes LC_Send_L_prime message containing 256-bit L' available for the transmitter to read immediately after computation of L' to ensure that the message is received by the transmitter within the specified 20 ms timeout at the transmitter.

In the case of a locality check failure due to expiration of the watchdog timer or due to mismatch of L and L' at the HDCP Transmitter, locality check may be reattempted by the HDCP Transmitter for a maximum of 1023 additional attempts (for a maximum allowed 1024 total trials) with the transmission of an LC_Init message containing a new r_n . Failure of locality check on the first attempt and subsequent zero or more reattempts results in an authentication failure and the authentication protocol is aborted.

2.4 Session Key Exchange

Successful completion of AKE and locality check stages affirms to HDCP Transmitter that the HDCP Receiver is authorized to receive HDCP Content. Session Key Exchange (SKE) is initiated by the HDCP Transmitter after a successful locality check. The HDCP Transmitter sends encrypted Session Key to the HDCP Receiver at least 200 ms before enabling HDCP Encryption and beginning the transmission of HDCP Content. HDCP Encryption may be enabled 200 ms after the transmission of the encrypted Session Key to the HDCP Receiver and at no time prior. Content encrypted with the Session Key k_s starts to flow between the HDCP Transmitter and HDCP Receiver. HDCP Encryption must be enabled only after successful completion of AKE, locality check and SKE stages.

During SKE, the HDCP Transmitter

- Generates a pseudo-random 128-bit Session Key k_s and 64-bit pseudo-random number r_{iv} .
- Performs key derivation as explained in Section 2.7 to generate 128-bit $dkey_2$ where $dkey_2$ is the derived key when $ctr=2$.
- Computes 128-bit $E_{dkey}(k_s) = k_s \text{ XOR } (dkey_2 \text{ XOR } r_{rx})$, where r_{rx} is XORed with the least-significant 64-bits of $dkey_2$.
- Writes SKE_Send_Eks message containing $E_{dkey}(k_s)$ and r_{iv} to the HDCP Receiver.

On receiving SKE_Send_Eks message, the HDCP Receiver

- Performs key derivation as explained in Section 2.7 to generate 128-bit $dkey_2$ where $dkey_2$ is the derived key when $ctr=2$.
- Computes $k_s = E_{dkey}(k_s) \text{ XOR } (dkey_2 \text{ XOR } r_{rx})$

2.5 Authentication with Repeaters

The HDCP Transmitter executes authentication with repeaters after Session Key exchange and only when REPEATER bit is set, indicating that the connected HDCP Receiver is an HDCP Repeater. Authentication with repeaters stage is used for the upstream propagation of topology information and the downstream propagation of Content Stream management information as explained in Section 2.5.1 and Section 2.5.2 respectively. Authentication with repeaters may be implemented by the HDCP Transmitter in parallel with the flow of encrypted content and Link Integrity Check. The Link Integrity Check process is explained in Section 2.6.

2.5.1 Upstream Propagation of Topology Information




Figure 2.5. Upstream Propagation of Topology Information

Figure 2.5 illustrates the upstream propagation of topology information. This stage assembles a list of all downstream *Receiver IDs* connected to the HDCP Repeater through a permitted connection tree, enabling revocation support upstream. This stage is implemented after successful completion of Session Key Exchange. This stage is used to assemble the latest topology information at the beginning of the HDCP Session immediately following an SKE or on subsequent changes to the topology due to connect or disconnect of an HDCP Receiver or HDCP Repeater.

HDCP Repeaters assemble the list of all connected downstream HDCP Receivers as the downstream HDCP-protected Interface Ports of the HDCP Repeater successfully complete the authentication protocol with connected HDCP Receivers. The list is represented by a contiguous set of bytes, with each *Receiver ID* occupying five bytes stored in big-endian order. The total length of the Receiver ID list is five bytes times the total number of connected and active downstream HDCP Devices, including downstream HDCP Repeaters, with which the HDCP Repeater has successfully completed the authentication protocol. This total number is represented in the RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID list message by the DEVICE_COUNT value. An HDCP-protected Interface Port with no active device connected adds nothing to the list. Also, the *Receiver ID* of the HDCP Repeater itself at any level is not included in its own Receiver ID list. An HDCP-protected Interface Port connected to an HDCP Receiver that is not an HDCP Repeater adds the *Receiver ID* of the connected HDCP Receiver to the list. HDCP-protected Interface Ports that have an HDCP Repeater connected add the Receiver ID list received from the connected downstream HDCP Repeater, plus the *Receiver ID* of the connected downstream HDCP Repeater itself.

When the HDCP Repeater has assembled the complete list of *Receiver IDs* of connected and active HDCP Devices with which the HDCP Repeater has successfully completed the authentication protocol, it computes the 256-bit verification value V' .

An HDCP Repeater and an HDCP Transmitter compute respective V' and V values as given below. HMAC-SHA256 is computed over the concatenation of Receiver ID list, *RxInfo* and *seq_num_V* received as part of the RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message. The key used for HMAC is k_d .

$$V' \text{ (or } V) = \text{HMAC-SHA256}(\text{Receiver ID list} \parallel \text{RxInfo} \parallel \text{seq_num_V}, k_d)$$

Receiver ID list is formed by appending downstream *Receiver IDs* in big-endian order. When the Receiver ID list, V' , DEPTH, DEVICE_COUNT, HDCP2_LEGACY_DEVICE_DOWNSTREAM and HDCP1_DEVICE_DOWNSTREAM are available, the HDCP Repeater prepares the RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message for the upstream Transmitter, asserts the READY status in the *RxStatus* register and sets the Message_Size field in the *RxStatus* register to the size of the RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List. The Message_Size field must be set by the HDCP Repeater immediately after READY is asserted.

After transmitting the SKE_Send_Eks message, the HDCP Transmitter, having determined that REPEATER received earlier in the protocol is set, sets a three second watchdog timer and polls the HDCP Repeater's READY status bit and if it's set, along with a non-zero Message_Size, reads the RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message. If the asserted READY status is not received by the HDCP Transmitter within a maximum-permitted time of three seconds after transmitting SKE_Send_Eks message, authentication of the HDCP Repeater fails. With this failure, the HDCP Transmitter disables HDCP Encryption and aborts the authentication protocol with the HDCP Repeater.

When READY is set, the HDCP Transmitter reads the RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message. The HDCP Repeater makes available the most significant 128-bits of V' for the transmitter to read as part of the RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message.

The HDCP Repeater initializes *seq_num_V* to 0 at the beginning of the HDCP Session i.e. after AKE_Init is received. It is incremented by one after the transmission of every RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message. *seq_num_V* must never be reused during an HDCP Session for the computation of V (or V'). If *seq_num_V* rolls over, the HDCP Transmitter must detect the roll-over in the RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List read from the HDCP Repeater and the transmitter must disable HDCP Encryption if encryption is enabled, restart authentication by the transmission of a new AKE_Init message.

When the HDCP Repeater receives HDCP2_LEGACY_DEVICE_DOWNSTREAM or HDCP1_DEVICE_DOWNSTREAM bits that are set from a downstream HDCP Repeater, it must propagate this information to the upstream HDCP Transmitter by setting the corresponding bits in the RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message.

If HDCP2_LEGACY_DEVICE_DOWNSTREAM or HDCP1_DEVICE_DOWNSTREAM bit is set, the Upstream Content Control Function may instruct the most upstream HDCP Transmitter to abort the transmission of certain HDCP encrypted Type 1 Content Streams. The most upstream HDCP Transmitter must be prepared to process the request and immediately cease the transmission of specific Content Streams as instructed by the Upstream Content Control Function.

Whenever the HDCP Transmitter reads the RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message, it verifies the integrity of the Receiver ID list by computing V and comparing the most significant

128-bits of V and V' . If the values do not match, authentication fails, the authentication protocol is aborted and HDCP Encryption is disabled.

On successful verification of Receiver ID list and topology information, i.e. if the values match, none of the reported *Receiver IDs* are in the current revocation list (in the case of the most upstream HDCP Transmitter), the HDCP Transmitter does not detect a roll-over of *seq_num_V*, the downstream topology does not exceed specified maximums (explained below), the HDCP Transmitter (including downstream port of HDCP Repeater) writes the least significant 128-bits of V to the HDCP Repeater as part of the *RepeaterAuth_Send_Ack* message. Every *RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List* message from the repeater to the transmitter must be followed by a *RepeaterAuth_Send_Ack* message from the transmitter to repeater on successful verification of Receiver ID list and topology information by the transmitter.

The *RepeaterAuth_Send_Ack* message, i.e. the last byte of V , must be received by the HDCP Repeater within two seconds from the time the *READY* status was asserted by the HDCP Repeater and the downstream topology does not exceed specified maximums. A match between the least significant 128-bits of V and V' indicates successful upstream transmission of topology information. If a mismatch occurs or the *RepeaterAuth_Send_Ack* message is not received by the repeater within two seconds, the HDCP Repeater must set the *REAUTH_REQ* status bit in the *RxStatus* register and must transition in to an unauthenticated state (See Section 2.10.3).

Refer to Table 2.2 for the HDCP Repeater upstream and downstream propagation time.

The HDCP Repeater propagates topology information upward through the connection tree to the HDCP Transmitter. An HDCP Repeater reports the topology status variables *DEVICE_COUNT* and *DEPTH*. The *DEVICE_COUNT* for an HDCP Repeater is equal to the total number of connected downstream HDCP Receivers and HDCP Repeaters. The value is calculated as the sum of the number of directly connected downstream HDCP Receivers and HDCP Repeaters plus the sum of the *DEVICE_COUNT* received from all connected HDCP Repeaters. The *DEPTH* status for an HDCP Repeater is equal to the maximum number of connection levels below any of the downstream HDCP-protected Interface Ports. The value is calculated as the maximum *DEPTH* reported from downstream HDCP Repeaters plus one (accounting for the connected downstream HDCP Repeater).

In Figure 2.6, R1 has three downstream HDCP Receivers connected to it. It reports a *DEPTH* of one and a *DEVICE_COUNT* of three.




Figure 2.6. DEPTH and DEVICE_COUNT for HDCP Repeater

In Figure 2.7, R1 reports a *DEPTH* of two and a *DEVICE_COUNT* of four.




Figure 2.7. DEPTH and DEVICE_COUNT for HDCP Repeater

HDCP Repeaters must be capable of supporting `DEVICE_COUNT` values of up to 31 and `DEPTH` values of up to 4. If the computed `DEVICE_COUNT` for an HDCP Repeater exceeds 31, the error is referred to as `MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED` error. The repeater sets `MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED` bit to one in the `RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List` message. If the computed `DEPTH` for an HDCP Repeater exceeds four, the error is referred to as `MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED` error. The repeater sets `MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED` bit to one in the `RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List` message. When an HDCP Repeater receives a `MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED` or a `MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED` error from a downstream HDCP Repeater, it must propagate the error to the upstream HDCP Transmitter and assert the `READY` bit. If a transmitter receives these errors, it must not read the most significant 128-bits of `V'`, `Receiver ID` list and `seq_num_V` from the HDCP Repeater since the HDCP Repeater will not include these fields in the `RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List` message.

Authentication fails if the topology maximums are exceeded. HDCP Encryption is disabled and the authentication protocol is aborted. The top-level HDCP Transmitter, having already performed SRM integrity check during AKE, proceeds to see if the *Receiver ID* of any downstream device from the `Receiver ID` list is found in the current revocation list, and, if present, authentication fails, HDCP Encryption is disabled and authentication protocol is aborted.

In some instances, certain Upstream Content Control Functions may implement functionality to perform revocation checking of the downstream HDCP Receivers (including HDCP Repeaters). In such instances, and if requested by such Upstream Content Control Function, the top-level HDCP Transmitter must pass the downstream *Receiver IDs*, including the *Receiver ID* of the attached downstream HDCP Receiver or HDCP Repeater and any *Receiver IDs* received as part of the `Receiver ID` list, to such Upstream Content Control Function. If the top-level HDCP Transmitter receives an indication from the Upstream Content Control Function that a downstream device has been found to be revoked, the top-level HDCP Transmitter must fail authentication, disable HDCP Encryption and abort the authentication protocol.




Figure 2.8. HDCP Repeater Protocol Timing Requirements

| From | To | Max Delay | Conditions and Comments |
|---|--|-------------|---|
| SKE_Send_Eks1 Session Key received from Upstream HDCP Transmitter | SKE_Send_Eks2 k_s generated by HDCP Repeater transmitted downstream | 100 ms | Downstream propagation time. |
| SKE_Send_Eks3 k_s transmitted to all downstream HDCP-protected Interface Ports | RDY1 Upstream READY asserted | 200 ms | Upstream propagation time when no downstream HDCP Repeaters are attached (no downstream Receiver ID lists to process) |
| RDY1 Downstream Receiver IDs and topology information received | RDY2 Upstream READY asserted | 200 ms | Upstream propagation time when one or more HDCP Repeaters are attached. From latest downstream READY (downstream Receiver ID lists must be processed) |
| SKE_Send_Eks1 Upstream HDCP Transmitter transmits k_s | RDY2 Upstream transmitter receives asserted READY | 1.2 seconds | For the Maximum of four repeater levels, 4 * (100 ms + 200 ms) |

Table 2.2. HDCP Repeater Protocol Timing Requirements

Table 2.2 specifies HDCP Repeater timing requirements that bound the worst-case propagation time for the Receiver ID list. A maximum delay of three seconds, to receive the RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message by the upstream transmitter, has been provided after transmission of the SKE_Send_Eks message to account for authentication delays due to the presence of downstream receivers that have not been paired with the upstream HDCP Repeater. Note that because each HDCP Repeater does not know the number of downstream HDCP Repeaters, it must use the same three-second timeout used by the upstream HDCP Transmitter for receiving the RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message.

2.5.1.1 Topology Information Propagation Due To Topology Changes

When an HDCP Receiver (including HDCP Repeater) is newly connected to the HDCP Repeater or disconnected from the HDCP Repeater, and the HDCP Repeater has already completed the authentication protocol with the upstream HDCP Transmitter, the HDCP Repeater must make the RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message available for the upstream HDCP Transmitter to read, assert the READY status bit and set the Message_Size register to the size of the RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message.. The RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message must include the Receiver IDs of all connected and active downstream HDCP Receivers with which the HDCP Repeater has successfully completed the authentication protocol.

An HDCP Repeater, which receives the RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message from a downstream HDCP Repeater, must propagate the message further upstream. This enables upstream propagation of the most recent topology information after changes to the topology without interrupting the transmission of HDCP Content.

2.5.2 Downstream Propagation of Content Stream Management Information




Figure 2.9. Downstream Propagation of Content Stream Management Information

The HDCP Transmitter propagates Content Stream management information, which includes Type value assigned to the Content Stream, using the RepeaterAuth_Stream_Manage message to the attached HDCP Repeater. The HDCP Transmitter executes this step after successful completion of Session Key Exchange and before beginning the transmission of a Content Stream after HDCP Encryption to the HDCP Repeater. The RepeaterAuth_Stream_Manage message from an HDCP Transmitter to the attached HDCP Repeater identifies any restriction, as specified by the Upstream Content Control Function, on the transmission of the Content Stream to specific devices.

A Type value is assigned to the Content Stream by the most upstream HDCP Transmitter based on instructions received from the Upstream Content Control Function. The exact mechanism used by the Upstream Content Control Function to instruct the HDCP Transmitter is outside the scope of this specification. Type 0 Content Stream (see Section 4.2.12) may be transmitted by the HDCP Repeater to all HDCP Devices. Type 1 Content Stream (see Section 4.2.12) must not be transmitted by the HDCP Repeater through its HDCP-protected Interface Ports connected to HDCP 1.x-compliant Devices, HDCP 2.0-compliant Devices and HDCP 2.1-compliant Devices.

Please refer to Section 3.3.1 of Exhibit C of the HDCP License Agreement for compliance rules related to audio portions of HDCP Content that is Audiovisual Content.

The HDCP Transmitter must write the RepeaterAuth_Stream_Manage message specifying Type value assigned to the Content Stream, to the attached HDCP Repeater at least 100ms before the transmission of the corresponding Content Stream after HDCP Encryption. The HDCP Transmitter must only send the RepeaterAuth_Stream_Manage message corresponding to the encrypted Content Stream it will transmit to the HDCP Repeater. The HDCP Transmitter initializes seq_num_M to 0 at the beginning of the HDCP Session i.e. after AKE_Init is sent.

On receiving the RepeaterAuth_Stream_Manage message, the HDCP Repeater computes M' as given below. HMAC-SHA256 is computed over the concatenation of $StreamID_Type$ (see Section 4.2.12) and seq_num_M values received as part of the RepeaterAuth_Stream_Manage message. All values are in big-endian order. The key used for HMAC is $SHA256(k_d)$.

M' (or M) = HMAC-SHA256(*StreamID_Type* || *seq_num_M*, SHA256(k_a)).

M' must be made available by the HDCP Repeater for the HDCP Transmitter to read as part of the RepeaterAuth_Stream_Ready message.

The RepeaterAuth_Stream_Ready message must be available for the transmitter to read within 100 ms from the time the transmitter finishes writing the RepeaterAuth_Stream_Manage message parameters to the HDCP Receiver. RepeaterAuth_Stream_Manage message from the transmitter to the repeater must be followed by a RepeaterAuth_Stream_Ready message from the repeater to the transmitter.

When the RepeaterAuth_Stream_Ready message is read, the HDCP Transmitter verifies the integrity of the message by computing M and comparing this value to M' . If M is equal to M' , the HDCP Transmitter may transmit the Content Stream identified in the corresponding RepeaterAuth_Stream_Manage message. If the RepeaterAuth_Stream_Ready message is not available for the transmitter to read within 100 ms or if M is not equal to M' , the HDCP Transmitter must not transmit the Content Stream identified in the corresponding RepeaterAuth_Stream_Manage message. Type value is assigned to the Content Stream through the successful transmission/reception of a single RepeaterAuth_Stream_Manage message. The Content Stream shall be associated with such Type value throughout the HDCP Session.

An HDCP Repeater connected to an HDCP 2.0-compliant Transmitter or an HDCP 1.x-compliant Transmitter will not receive the RepeaterAuth_Stream_Manage message from the transmitter. In this case, the HDCP Repeater must assign a Type value of 0x00 to all Content Streams received from the HDCP Transmitter.

The HDCP Repeater must in turn propagate the received Content Stream management information using the RepeaterAuth_Stream_Manage message further downstream.

2.6 Link Integrity Check

After successful completion of SKE, HDCP Encryption is enabled and encrypted content starts to flow between the HDCP Transmitter and the HDCP Receiver. Once encryption is enabled, an ongoing Link Integrity Check is performed by the HDCP Receiver to check that cipher synchronization is maintained between the HDCP Transmitter and the HDCP Receiver.

The HDMI data transmission stream includes data island packets which incorporate ECC parity. The HDCP Transmitter must ensure that at least one such packet is transmitted to the HDCP Receiver for every two frames. The HDCP Receiver maintains an ongoing log of data island packet ECC errors. Once the HDCP Receiver detects ongoing ECC errors, the HDCP Receiver determines that cipher synchronization is lost. While the receiver may reach a determination sooner, the receiver must determine loss of synchronization at least by the time it has detected 50 consecutive data island packets with ECC errors. The HDCP Receiver must either assert the REAUTH_REQ bit of the *RxStatus* register or de-assert HDCP_HPD to the upstream transmitter once it determines loss of synchronization. The Transmitter polls the *RxStatus* register and if it detects the REAUTH_REQ bit is set, it may initiate re-authentication

Polling of the *RxStatus* register by the HDCP Transmitter is done at least once every second while the Transmitter is in the authenticated state.

2.7 Key Derivation

Key derivation is illustrated in Figure 2.10.




Figure 2.10. Key Derivation

r_{tx} is concatenated with $r_{rx} \text{ XOR } \text{ctr}$ ($r_{tx} \parallel (r_{rx} \text{ XOR } \text{ctr})$). All values are in big-endian order. ctr is a 64-bit counter and is initialized to 0 at the beginning of the HDCP Session i.e. after AKE_Init is sent or received. It is incremented by one after every derived key computation. $dkey_i$ is the 128-bit derived key when $\text{ctr} = i$. ctr must never be reused during an HDCP Session.


r_n is initialized to 0 during AKE i.e. during the generation of $dkey_0$ and $dkey_1$. It is set to a pseudo-random value during locality check as explained in Section 2.3. The pseudo-random r_n is XORed with the least-significant 64-bits of k_m during generation of $dkey_2$.

2.8 HDCP Transmitter State Diagram

As explained in Section 1.3, the HDCP Transmitter may support simultaneous connections to HDCP Receivers through one or more of its HDCP-protected interface ports. The HDCP Transmitter state diagram is implemented independently on each HDCP-protected interface port.

The HDCP Transmitter Link State Diagram and HDCP Transmitter Authentication Protocol State Diagram (Figure 2.11 and Figure 2.12) illustrate the operation states of the authentication protocol for an HDCP Transmitter that is not an HDCP Repeater. For HDCP Repeaters, the downstream (HDCP Transmitter) side is covered in Section 2.10.2.

Transmitter's decision to begin authentication is dependent on events such as HDCP_HPD (HDCP Hot Plug Detect) of an attached HDCP Receiver, completion of certain phases of the operating system, a software request, and mode settings. When an HDCP Receiver acknowledges a read of the HDCP2Version register, it must be ready to authenticate, and, in the event of authentication failure, must be prepared to process subsequent authentication attempts. The HDCP Transmitter should not attempt to authenticate until it has successfully obtained an acknowledged read of the HDCP2Version register. Should the HDCP2Version register read or the authentication fail, the HDCP Transmitter must retry periodically, with a period of no more than 2 seconds (preferably much more often). It may cease to attempt authentication only if the HDCP Receiver is clearly disconnected, as with $\text{HDCP_HPD} = \text{"Low"}$.



Note: Transition arrows with no connected state (e.g. Reset) indicate transitions that can occur from multiple states

Figure 2.11. HDCP Transmitter Link State Diagram




Figure 2.12. HDCP Transmitter Authentication Protocol State Diagram

Transition Any State:H0. Reset conditions at the HDCP Transmitter or loss of HDCP_HPD cause the HDCP Transmitter to enter the No Receiver Attached state. Some TMDS transmitters have the ability to directly sense the presence of a TMDS receiver (Receiver Sense). If this signal is present and indicates the absence of an HDCP Receiver, it should cause a transition to State H0.

Transition H0:H1. The detection of a sink device (through HDCP_HPD) indicates to the transmitter that a sink device is connected and ready to display the received content.

State H1: Transmit Low-value Content. In this state, the transmitter reads the HDCP2Version register. The transmitter determines that the receiver is HDCP 2 capable by reading bit[2] in the receiver's HDCP2Version register. If this bit is set to 1, it indicates that the receiver is HDCP 2 capable. In this state the transmitter should begin sending an unencrypted signal with HDCP Encryption disabled. The transmitted signal can be a low value content or informative on-screen display. This will ensure that a valid video signal is displayed to the user before and during authentication.

Transition H1:A0. If content protection is desired by the Upstream Content Control Function and the receiver is HDCP 2 capable, then the HDCP Transmitter moves to the A0 state.

State A0: Rx Known to be HDCP 2 Capable. If state A0 is reached when content protection is desired by the Upstream Content Control Function, authentication must be started immediately by the transmitter if the receiver is HDCP 2 capable. A valid video screen is displayed to the user with encryption disabled during this time.

Transition A0:H1. If content protection is no longer desired by the Upstream Content Control Function, the transmitter continues to transmit low value content or informative on-screen display.

Transition A0:A1. The transmitter initiates the authentication protocol.

State A1: Exchange k_m . In this state, the HDCP Transmitter initiates authentication by writing AKE_Init message to the HDCP Receiver. It reads AKE_Send_Cert from the receiver within 100 ms after writing the AKE_Init message.

If the HDCP Transmitter does not have k_m stored corresponding to the *Receiver ID*, it generates $E_{k_{pub}}(k_m)$ and sends $E_{k_{pub}}(k_m)$ as part of the AKE_No_Stored_km message to the receiver after verification of signature on $cert_{rx}$. It performs integrity check on the SRM and checks to see whether the *Receiver ID* of the connected HDCP Device is in the revocation list. It computes H, reads AKE_Send_H_prime message from the receiver containing H' within one second after writing AKE_No_Stored_km to the receiver and compares H' against H.

If the HDCP Transmitter has k_m stored corresponding to the *Receiver ID*, it writes AKE_Stored_km message containing $E_{kh}(k_m)$ and m to the receiver, performs integrity check on the SRM and checks to see whether the *Receiver ID* of the connected HDCP Device is in the revocation list. It computes H, reads AKE_Send_H_prime message from the receiver containing H' within 200 ms after writing AKE_Stored_km to the receiver and compares H' against H.

If the HDCP Transmitter does not have a k_m stored corresponding to the *Receiver ID*, it implements pairing with the HDCP Receiver as explained in Section 2.2.1.

Transition A1:A0. This transition occurs on failure of signature verification on $cert_{rx}$, failure of SRM integrity check, if *Receiver ID* of the connected HDCP Device is in the revocation list or if there is a mismatch between H and H' . This transition also occurs if AKE_Send_H_prime message is not received within one second after writing AKE_No_Stored_km or within 200 ms after writing AKE_Stored_km to the receiver.

Transition A1:A2. The HDCP Transmitter implements locality check after successful completion of AKE and pairing.

State A2: Locality Check. In this state, the HDCP Transmitter implements the locality check as explained in Section 2.3 with the HDCP Receiver.

Transition A2:A0. This transition occurs on one or more consecutive locality check failures. Locality check fails when the last byte of the LC_Send_L_prime message is not received by the transmitter within 20 ms and the watchdog timer at the HDCP Transmitter expires or on a mismatch between L and L' .

Transition A2:A3. The HDCP Transmitter implements SKE after successful completion of locality check.

State A3: Exchange k_s . The HDCP Transmitter sends encrypted Session Key, $E_{dkey}(k_s)$, and r_{iv} to the HDCP Receiver as part of the SKE_Send_Eks message. It may enable HDCP Encryption 200

ms after sending encrypted Session Key. HDCP Encryption must be enabled only after successful completion of AKE, locality check and SKE stages.

Transition A3:A4. This transition occurs after completion of SKE.

State A4: Test for Repeater. The HDCP Transmitter evaluates the REPEATER value that was received in State A1.

Transition A4:A5. REPEATER bit is not set (the HDCP Receiver is not an HDCP Repeater).

State A5: Authenticated. At this time, and at no prior time, the HDCP Transmitter has completed the authentication protocol. In the authenticated state the HDCP Transmitter must poll the *RxStatus* register no less frequently than once every second.

Transition A4:A6. REPEATER bit is set (the HDCP Receiver is an HDCP Repeater).

State A6: Wait for Receiver ID List. The HDCP Transmitter sets up a three-second watchdog timer after sending SKE_Send_Eks and polls READY.

Transition A6:A0. The watchdog timer expires before READY has been asserted by the repeater.

Transition A6:A7. READY bit is asserted.

State A7: Verify Receiver ID List. If a transition in to this state occurs from State A6, the watchdog timer is cleared. The transmitter reads the RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message. If both MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED and MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED bits are not set, the transmitter computes V and compares the most significant 128-bits of V and V' . The *Receiver IDs* from the Receiver ID list are compared against the current revocation list.

Transition A7:A0. This transition is made if a mismatch occurs between the most significant 128-bits of V and V' . This transition is also made if any of the *Receiver IDs* in the Receiver ID list are found in the current revocation list or if the HDCP Transmitter detects a roll-over of *seq_num_V*. A MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED or MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED error also causes this transition.

Transition A7:A8. This transition occurs on successful verification of the most significant 128-bits of V and V' , none of the reported *Receiver IDs* are in the current revocation list, the HDCP Transmitter does not detect a roll-over of *seq_num_V* and the downstream topology does not exceed specified maximums.

State A8: Send Receiver ID list acknowledgement. , The HDCP Transmitter sends the least significant 128-bits of V to the HDCP Repeater as part of the RepeaterAuth_Send_Ack message.

The RepeaterAuth_Send_Ack message must be received by the HDCP Repeater within two seconds from the time the READY status was asserted by the HDCP Repeater.

Transition A8:A9. This transition occurs after the RepeaterAuth_Send_Ack message has been written to the repeater and the transmitter has not yet transmitted Content Stream Management information to the attached HDCP Repeater.

Transition A8:A5. This transition occurs after the RepeaterAuth_Send_Ack message has been written to the repeater and the transmitter has already transmitted Content Stream Management information to the attached HDCP Repeater.

Transition A5:A0. The HDCP Transmitter periodically polls the REAUTH_REQ bit in the *RxStatus* register. The HDCP Receiver sets this bit to 1 if it detects a synchronization mismatch

between Transmitter and Receiver. The REAUTH_REQ bit is also set to one by the attached HDCP Repeater if the RepeaterAuth_Send_Ack message is not received by the HDCP Repeater within two seconds or on a mismatch between the least significant 128-bits of V and V' . This transition occurs if the HDCP Transmitter detects that the REAUTH_REQ bit is set.

Transition A5:A7. The HDCP Transmitter periodically polls the READY bit in the *RxStatus* register. This transition occurs if the READY bit is set (See Section 2.5.1.1).

State A9: Content Stream Management. This stage is implemented if Content Stream is to be transmitted. The HDCP Transmitter sends the RepeaterAuth_Stream_Manage message specifying the Type value assigned to the Content Stream, to the attached HDCP Repeater at least 100ms before the transmission of the Content Stream after HDCP Encryption. It must receive the RepeaterAuth_Stream_Ready message from the HDCP Repeater within 100 ms after the transmission of RepeaterAuth_Stream_Manage message and verifies M' . This step fails if the RepeaterAuth_Stream_Ready message is not available to read within 100 ms or if M is not equal to M' .

This stage may be implemented in parallel with the upstream propagation of topology information (State A4, State A6, State A7 and State A8). This state may be implemented asynchronously from the rest of the state diagram. A transition in to this state may occur from State A4, State A6, State A7 or State A8 if Content Stream is to be transmitted. Also, the transition from State A9 must return to the appropriate state to allow for uninterrupted operation.

Transition A9:A5. This transition occurs on success or failure of the Content Stream management stage.

Note: Since Link Integrity Check (State A5) may be implemented in parallel with the upstream propagation of topology information (State A4, State A6, State A7 and State A8), the link integrity check process (i.e. State A5) may be implemented asynchronously from the rest of the state diagram. The transition into State A5 may occur from any state for which encryption is currently enabled. Also, the transition from State A5 returns to the appropriate state to allow for uninterrupted operation.

The HDCP Transmitter may support simultaneous connections to HDCP Receivers through one or more of its HDCP-protected interface ports. It may share the same Session Key and r_{iv} across all its HDCP-protected interface ports, as explained in Section 3.4. However, the HDCP Transmitter must ensure that each connected HDCP Receiver receives distinct k_m and r_{ts} values.

2.9 HDCP Receiver State Diagram

The operation states of the authentication protocol for an HDCP Receiver that is not an HDCP Repeater are illustrated in Figure 2.13 **Error! Reference source not found.** For HDCP Repeaters, the upstream (HDCP Receiver) side is covered in Section 2.10.3.

The HDCP Receiver must be ready to re-authenticate with the HDCP Transmitter at any point in time. In particular, the only indication to the HDCP Receiver of a re-authentication attempt by the HDCP Transmitter is the reception of the AKE_Init message from the HDCP Transmitter.




Figure 2.13. HDCP Receiver Authentication Protocol State Diagram

Transition Any State:B0. Reset conditions at the HDCP Receiver cause the HDCP Receiver to enter the unauthenticated state.

State B0: Unauthenticated. The HDCP Receiver is awaiting the reception of AKE_Init from the HDCP Transmitter to trigger the authentication protocol.

Transition B0:B1. AKE_Init message is received from the HDCP Transmitter.

State B1: Compute k_m . In this state, the HDCP Receiver makes the AKE_Send_Cert message available for reading by the transmitter in response to AKE_Init. If AKE_No_Stored_km is received, the receiver decrypts k_m with $k_{priv_{rx}}$, calculates H' . It makes AKE_Send_H_prime message available for reading immediately after computation of H' to ensure that the message is received by the transmitter within the specified one second timeout at the transmitter.

If AKE_Stored_km is received, the HDCP Receiver decrypts $E_{k_H}(k_m)$ to derive k_m and calculates H' . It makes AKE_Send_H_prime message available for reading immediately after computation of H' to ensure that the message is received by the transmitter within the specified 200 ms timeout at the transmitter

If AKE_No_Stored_km is received, this is an indication to the HDCP Receiver that the HDCP Transmitter does not contain a k_m stored corresponding to its Receiver ID. It implements pairing with the HDCP Transmitter as explained in Section 2.2.1.

Transition B1: B1. Should the HDCP Transmitter write an AKE_Init while the HDCP Receiver is in State B1, the HDCP Receiver abandons intermediate results and restarts computation of k_m .

Transition B1: B2. The transition occurs when r_n is received as part of LC_Init message from the transmitter.

State B2: Compute L' . The HDCP Receiver computes L' required during locality check and makes the LC_Send_L_prime message available for reading by the transmitter.

Transition B2: B1. Should the HDCP Transmitter write an AKE_Init while the HDCP Receiver is in State B2, the HDCP Receiver abandons intermediate results and restarts computation of k_m .

Transition B2: B3. The transition occurs when SKE_Send_Eks message is received from the transmitter.

State B3: Compute k_s . The HDCP Receiver decrypts $E_{dkey}(k_s)$ to derive k_s .

Transition B3: B1. Should the HDCP Transmitter write an AKE_Init while the HDCP Receiver is in State B3, the HDCP Receiver abandons intermediate results and restarts computation of k_m .

Transition B3: B4. Successful computation of k_s transitions the receiver into the authenticated state.

State B4: Authenticated. The HDCP Receiver has completed the authentication protocol. It must perform an ongoing link integrity check as described in Section 2.6. If the Receiver detects a synchronization mismatch between Transmitter and Receiver during the link integrity check, it must set the REAUTH_REQ bit in the *RxStatus* register.

Transition B4: B1. Should the HDCP Transmitter write an AKE_Init while the HDCP Receiver is in State B4, the HDCP Receiver abandons intermediate results and restarts computation of k_m .

2.10 HDCP Repeater State Diagrams

The HDCP Repeater has one HDCP-protected Interface connection to an upstream HDCP Transmitter and one or more HDCP-protected Interface connections to downstream HDCP Receivers. The state diagram for each downstream connection (Figure 2.14 and Figure 2.15) is substantially the same as that for the host HDCP Transmitter (Section 2.8), with the exception that the HDCP Repeater is not required to check for downstream Receiver IDs in a revocation list.

The HDCP Repeater signals the first detection of an active downstream HDCP Receiver to the upstream HDCP Transmitter by pulsing (pulse width must be greater than 100ms) the physical Hot Plug Detect signal of the upstream HDCP-protected Interface Port, or, for devices providing HDMI support for CP&EDID_HPD as specified in the HDMI1.4 specification, by signaling HDCP_HPD to the upstream connected HDCP Transmitter. Once in the authenticated state with one or more downstream HDCP Receivers, subsequent detection by the HDCP Repeater of additional newly active downstream HDCP Receivers is handled as specified in Section 2.5.1.1.

Whenever authentication is initiated by the upstream HDCP Transmitter by sending AKE_Init, the HDCP Repeater immediately initiates authentication on all its downstream HDCP-protected interface ports if its downstream ports are in an unauthenticated state.

The HDCP Repeater may cache the latest Receiver ID list and topology information received on its downstream ports. Whenever authentication is attempted by the upstream transmitter by writing the AKE_Init message, the HDCP Repeater may propagate the cached Receiver ID list upstream without initiating a re-authentication on all its downstream ports.

The HDCP Repeater must generate unique k_m values for HDCP Devices connected to each of its downstream HDCP-protected Interface Ports.

The HDCP Repeater may transmit the same session key, k_s , to all its authenticated and active downstream HDCP-protected Interface Ports before beginning the transmission of HDCP Content to any of its downstream ports. After beginning the transmission of HDCP Content by the HDCP Repeater to any of its downstream ports, subsequent connection of a new HDCP Receiver to its downstream port must result in (a) a unique session key, k_s , exchanged with that HDCP Receiver or (b) a new authentication attempt with all its downstream HDCP-protected Interface ports and

subsequent exchange of the same session key, k_s , to all its authenticated and active downstream HDCP-protected Interface Ports. If an HDCP Repeater has no active downstream HDCP Devices, it must authenticate as an HDCP Receiver with REPEATER bit set to zero if it wishes to receive HDCP Content, but must not pass HDCP Content to downstream devices.


When the upstream HDCP-protected Interface Port of the HDCP Repeater transitions in to an unauthenticated state from an authenticated state (See Transition C5:C0 and Transition C6:C0 in Section 2.10.3), the HDCP Repeater must set the REAUTH_REQ status bit in the *RxStatus* register. When the upstream HDCP Transmitter detects the REAUTH_REQ status bit set by polling, it may initiate re-authentication with the HDCP Repeater with the transmission of a new AKE_Init message.

2.10.1 Propagation of Topology Errors

MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED and MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED: HDCP Repeaters must be capable of supporting DEVICE_COUNT values of up to 31 and DEPTH values of up to 4. If the computed DEVICE_COUNT for an HDCP Repeater exceeds 31, the error is referred to as MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED error. The repeater sets MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED bit to one in the RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message. If the computed DEPTH for an HDCP Repeater exceeds four, the error is referred to as MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED error. The repeater sets MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED bit to one in the RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message. When an HDCP Repeater receives a MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED or a MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED error from a downstream HDCP Repeater, it must propagate the error to the upstream HDCP Transmitter and must not transmit V' , Receiver ID list and seq_num_V .

2.10.2 HDCP Repeater Downstream State Diagram

In this state diagram and its following description, the downstream (HDCP Transmitter) side refers to the HDCP Transmitter functionality within the HDCP Repeater for its corresponding downstream HDCP-protected Interface Port.



Note: Transition arrows with no connected state (e.g. Reset) indicate transitions that can occur from multiple states

Figure 2.14. HDCP Repeater Downstream Link State Diagram




Figure 2.15. HDCP Repeater Downstream Authentication Protocol State Diagram

Transition Any State:P0. Reset conditions at the HDCP Repeater or loss of HDCP_HPD cause the HDCP Repeater to enter the No Receiver Attached state. Some TMDS transmitters have the ability to directly sense the presence of a TMDS receiver (Receiver Sense). If this signal is present and indicates the absence of an HDCP Receiver, it should cause a transition to State P0.

Transition P0:P1. The detection of a sink device (through HDCP_HPD) indicates that the receiver is available and active (ready to display received content).

State P1: Transmit low-value content. In this state, the downstream side reads the HDCP2Version register. The downstream side determines that the receiver is HDCP 2 capable by reading bit[2] in the receiver's HDCP2Version register. If this bit is set to 1, it indicates that the receiver is HDCP 2 capable. In this state the downstream side should begin sending the unencrypted video signal received from the upstream HDCP Transmitter with HDCP Encryption disabled.

Transition P1:F0. Upon an Upstream Authentication Request, if the receiver is HDCP2 capable, the downstream side moves to the F0 state.

State F0: Receiver Known to be HDCP 2 Capable. If state F0 is reached upon an Upstream Authentication Request, authentication must be started immediately by the downstream side if the receiver is HDCP 2 capable. A valid video screen is displayed to the user with encryption disabled during this time.

Note: The downstream side may initiate authentication with the attached HDCP Receiver before an Upstream Authentication Request is received.

Transition F0:P1. If content protection is no longer desired, the downstream side continues to transmit low value content or informative on-screen display received from the upstream HDCP Transmitter.

Transition F0:F1. The downstream side initiates the authentication protocol.

State F1: Exchange k_m . In this state, the downstream side initiates authentication by writing AKE_Init message to the HDCP Receiver. It reads AKE_Send_Cert from the receiver within 100 ms after writing AKE_Init message.

If the downstream side does not have k_m stored corresponding to the *Receiver ID*, it generates $E_{k_{pub}}(k_m)$ and sends $E_{k_{pub}}(k_m)$ as part of the AKE_No_Stored_km message to the receiver after verification of signature on $cert_{rx}$. It computes H, receives AKE_Send_H_prime message from the receiver containing H' within one second after writing AKE_No_Stored_km to the receiver and compares H' against H.

If the downstream side has k_m stored corresponding to the *Receiver ID*, it sends AKE_Stored_km message containing $E_{k_h}(k_m)$ and m to the receiver. It computes H, receives AKE_Send_H_prime message from the receiver containing H' within 200 ms after writing AKE_Stored_km to the receiver and compares H' against H.

If the downstream side does not have a k_m stored corresponding to the *Receiver ID*, it implements pairing with the HDCP Receiver as explained in Section 2.2.1.

Transition F1:F0. This transition occurs on failure of signature verification on $cert_{rx}$ or if there is a mismatch between H and H' . This transition also occurs if AKE_Send_H_prime message is not received within one second after writing AKE_No_Stored_km or within 200 ms after writing AKE_Stored_km to the receiver.

Transition F1:F2. The downstream side implements locality check after successful completion of AKE and pairing.

State F2: Locality Check. In this state, the downstream side implements the locality check as explained in Section 2.3 with the HDCP Receiver.

Transition F2:F0. This transition occurs on one or more consecutive locality check failures. Locality check fails when the last byte of the LC_Send_L_prime message is not received by the transmitter within 20 ms and the watchdog timer at the downstream side expires or on a mismatch between L and L' .

Transition F2:F3. The downstream side implements SKE after successful completion of locality check.

State F3: Exchange k_s . The downstream side sends encrypted Session Key, $E_{dk_{key}}(k_s)$, and r_{iv} to the HDCP Receiver as part of the SKE_Send_Eks message. It may enable HDCP Encryption 200 ms after sending encrypted Session Key. HDCP Encryption must be enabled only after successful completion of AKE, locality check and SKE stages.

Transition F3:F4. This transition occurs after completion of SKE.

State F4: Test for Repeater. The downstream side evaluates the REPEATER value that was received in State F1.

Transition F4:F5. REPEATER bit is not set (the HDCP Receiver is not an HDCP Repeater).

State F5: Authenticated. At this time, and at no prior time, the downstream side has completed the authentication protocol. In the authenticated state the HDCP Repeater must poll the $RxStatus$ register no less frequently than once every second.

Transition F4:F6. REPEATER bit is set (the HDCP Receiver is an HDCP Repeater).

State F6: Wait for Receiver ID List. The downstream side sets up a three-second watchdog timer after sending SKE_Send_Eks and polls READY.

Transition F6:F0. The watchdog timer expires before READY has been asserted by the repeater.

Transition F6:F7. READY bit is asserted.

State F7: Verify Receiver ID List. If a transition in to this state occurs from State F6, the watchdog timer is cleared. The downstream side reads the RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message. If both MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED and MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED bits are not set, the downstream side computes V and compares the most significant 128-bits of V and V' . The *Receiver IDs* from this port are added to the Receiver ID list for this HDCP Repeater. The upstream HDCP Transmitter must be informed if topology maximums are exceeded.

Transition F7:F0. This transition is made if a mismatch occurs between the most significant 128-bits of V and V' . This transition is also made if the downstream side detects a roll-over of seq_num_V . A MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED or MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED error also causes this transition.

Transition F7:F8. This transition occurs on successful verification of the most significant 128-bits of V and V' , the downstream side does not detect a roll-over of seq_num_V and the downstream topology does not exceed specified maximums.

State F8: Send Receiver ID list acknowledgement. , The downstream side sends the least significant 128-bits of V to the attached HDCP Repeater as part of the RepeaterAuth_Send_Ack message.

The first byte of the RepeaterAuth_Send_Ack message must be written to the attached HDCP Repeater by the downstream side within two seconds from the time the READY status was asserted by the attached HDCP Repeater.

Transition F8:F9. This transition occurs after the RepeaterAuth_Send_Ack message has been written to the repeater and the downstream side has not yet transmitted Content Stream Management information to the attached HDCP Repeater.

Transition F8:F5. This transition occurs after the RepeaterAuth_Send_Ack message has been written to the repeater and the downstream side has already transmitted Content Stream Management information to the attached HDCP Repeater.

Transition F5:F0. The downstream side periodically polls the REAUTH_REQ bit in the *RxStatus* register. The HDCP Receiver sets this bit to 1 if it detects a synchronization mismatch between Transmitter and Receiver. The REAUTH_REQ bit is also set to one by the attached HDCP Repeater if the RepeaterAuth_Send_Ack message is not received by the HDCP Repeater within two seconds or on a mismatch between the least significant 128-bits of V and V' . This transition occurs if the downstream side detects that the REAUTH_REQ bit is set.

Transition F5:F7. The downstream side periodically polls the *RxStatus* register of the downstream HDCP Receiver to see if the READY bit is set. This transition occurs if READY is set.

State F9: Content Stream Management. This stage is implemented if Content Stream is to be transmitted. The downstream side propagates the Content Stream management information, received from the upstream transmitter, using the RepeaterAuth_Stream_Manage message to the attached HDCP Repeater at least 100ms before the transmission of the corresponding Content Stream after HDCP Encryption. If the upstream transmitter is HDCP 2.0-compliant or HDCP 1.x-compliant, the downstream side will not receive the RepeaterAuth_Stream_Manage message from the upstream transmitter and assigns a Type value of 0x00 to the Content Stream received from the upstream transmitter and propagates the Content Stream management information using the RepeaterAuth_Stream_Manage message.

The downstream side must receive the RepeaterAuth_Stream_Ready message from the HDCP Repeater within 100 ms after the transmission of RepeaterAuth_Stream_Manage message and verifies M' . This step fails if the RepeaterAuth_Stream_Ready message is not available to read within 100 ms or if M is not equal to M' .

This stage may be implemented in parallel with the upstream propagation of topology information (State F4, State F6, State F7 and State F8). This state may be implemented asynchronously from the rest of the state diagram. A transition in to this state may occur from State F4, State F6, State F7 or State F8 if Content Stream is to be transmitted and the Content Stream management information is received from the upstream HDCP Transmitter. Also, the transition from State F9 must return to the appropriate state to allow for uninterrupted operation.

Transition F9:F5. This transition occurs on success or failure of the Content Stream management stage.

Note: Since Link Integrity Check may be implemented in parallel with the upstream propagation of topology information (State F4, State F6, State F7 and State F8), the link integrity check process (i.e. State F5) may be implemented asynchronously from the rest of the state diagram. The transition into State F5 may occur from any state for which encryption is currently enabled. Also, the transition from State F5 returns to the appropriate state to allow for uninterrupted operation.

2.10.3 HDCP Repeater Upstream State Diagram

The HDCP Repeater upstream state diagram, illustrated in Figure 2.16, makes reference to states of the HDCP Repeater downstream state diagram. In this state diagram and its following description, the upstream (HDCP Receiver) side refers to the HDCP Receiver functionality within the HDCP Repeater for its corresponding upstream HDCP-protected Interface Port.




Figure 2.16. HDCP Repeater Upstream Authentication Protocol State Diagram

Transitions Any State:C0. Reset conditions at the HDCP Repeater cause the HDCP Repeater to enter the unauthenticated state. Re-authentication is forced any time **AKE_Init** is received from the connected HDCP Transmitter, with a transition through the unauthenticated state.

State C0: Unauthenticated. The device is idle, awaiting the reception of **AKE_Init** from the HDCP Transmitter to trigger the authentication protocol.

If a transition in to this state occurred from State C6 or from State C5, when State C5 is implemented in parallel with State C8, the upstream side must either set the **REAUTH_REQ** status bit in the **RxStatus** register or de-assert **HDCP_HPD** to the upstream transmitter.

Transition C0:C1. **AKE_Init** message is received from the HDCP Transmitter.

State C1: Compute k_m . In this state, the upstream (HDCP Receiver) side makes available the **AKE_Send_Cert** message for the transmitter to read in response to **AKE_Init**. If **AKE_No_Stored_km** is received, it decrypts k_m with $k_{priv_{rx}}$, calculates H' . It makes available the **AKE_Send_H_prime** message within one second from the time the transmitter finishes writing the **AKE_No_Stored_km** message parameters.

If **AKE_Stored_km** is received, the upstream side decrypts $E_{k_H}(k_m)$ to derive k_m and calculates H' . It makes available the **AKE_Send_H_prime** message within 200 ms from the time the transmitter finishes writing the **AKE_Stored_km** message parameters.

If **AKE_No_Stored_km** is received, this is an indication to the upstream side that the HDCP Transmitter does not contain a k_m stored corresponding to its *Receiver ID*. It implements pairing with the HDCP Transmitter as explained in Section 2.2.1.

Transition C1:C2. The transition occurs when r_n is received as part of LC_Init message from the transmitter.

State C2: Compute L' . The upstream side computes L' required during locality check and sends LC_Send_L_prime message.

Transition C2: C3. The transition occurs when SKE_Send_Eks message is received from the transmitter.

State C3: Compute k_s . The upstream side decrypts $E_{dkey}(k_s)$ to derive k_s .

Transition C3: C4. Successful computation of k_s causes this transition.

State C4: Wait for Downstream. The upstream state machine waits for all downstream HDCP-protected Interface Ports of the HDCP Repeater to enter the unconnected (State P0), unauthenticated (State P1), or the authenticated state (State F5).

Transition C4:C5. All downstream HDCP-protected Interface Ports with connected HDCP Receivers have reached the state of authenticated, unconnected or unauthenticated state.

State C5: Assemble Receiver ID List. The upstream side assembles the list of all connected downstream topology HDCP Devices as the downstream HDCP-protected Interface Ports reach terminal states of the authentication protocol. An HDCP-protected Interface Port that advances to State P0, the unconnected state, or P1, the unauthenticated state, does not add to the list. A downstream HDCP-protected Interface Port that arrives in State F5 that has an HDCP Receiver that is not an HDCP Repeater connected, adds the *Receiver ID* of the connected HDCP Receiver to the list. Downstream HDCP-protected Interface Ports that arrive in State F5 that have an HDCP Repeater connected will cause the Receiver ID list read from the connected HDCP Repeater, plus the *Receiver ID* of the connected HDCP Repeater itself, to be added to the list.

Note: The upstream side may add the Receiver ID list read from the HDCP Repeater connected to the downstream HDCP-protected Interface port, plus the *Receiver ID* of the connected HDCP Repeater itself to the list after the downstream port has transitioned in to State F8.

When the Receiver ID list for all downstream HDCP Receivers has been assembled, the upstream side computes DEPTH, DEVICE_COUNT and the upstream V' and asserts its READY status indicator in the *RxStatus* register.

In the case of a MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED or a MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED error, it asserts the corresponding bits to the upstream transmitter. When an HDCP Repeater receives a MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED or MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED error from a downstream HDCP Repeater, it is required to inform the upstream HDCP Transmitter.

If any downstream port connected to an HDCP Repeater detects the HDCP2_LEGACY_DEVICE_DOWNSTREAM or HDCP1_DEVICE_DOWNSTREAM bits read from the repeater to be set to one, the upstream side sets the corresponding bits to one in the *RxInfo* register which is read by the upstream HDCP Transmitter as part of the RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message.

Transition C5:C0. This transition occurs if RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message has been read by the upstream HDCP Transmitter and topology maximums are exceeded i.e. on a MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED or MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED error. This transition also occurs if all downstream HDCP-protected Interface Ports have reached the state of unconnected or unauthenticated.

Transition C5:C6. RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message has been read by the upstream HDCP Transmitter and topology maximums are not exceeded.

State C6. Verify Receiver ID list acknowledgement. In this state, the upstream side receives the RepeaterAuth_Send_Ack message from the upstream transmitter and compares the least significant 128-bits of V and V' . A match between the least significant 128-bits of V and V' indicates successful upstream transmission of topology information. The last byte of the RepeaterAuth_Send_Ack message must be written to the upstream side by the transmitter within two seconds from the time the READY status was asserted by the upstream side.

Transition C6:C0. This transition occurs if the RepeaterAuth_Send_Ack message is not received by the upstream side within two seconds or on a mismatch between the least significant 128-bits of V and V' . If this transition occurs, the upstream side must set the REAUTH_REQ status bit in the *RxStatus* register.

Transition C6:C7. This transition occurs if the RepeaterAuth_Send_Ack message is received by the upstream side within two seconds, on a successful match between the least significant 128-bits of V and V' and if the upstream side has not yet processed the Content Stream management information received from the upstream transmitter.

Transition C6:C8. This transition occurs if the RepeaterAuth_Send_Ack message is received by the upstream side within two seconds, on a successful match between the least significant 128-bits of V and V' and if the upstream side has already processed the Content Stream management information received from the upstream transmitter.

State C7: Content Stream Management. On receiving the RepeaterAuth_Stream_Manage message, the upstream side computes M' and makes it available for the the upstream Transmitter to read as part of the RepeaterAuth_Stream_Ready message.

This stage may be implemented in parallel with the upstream propagation of topology information (State C4, State C5 and State C6). This state may be implemented asynchronously from the rest of the state diagram. A transition in to this state may occur from State C4, State C5 or State C6 if Content Stream management information is received from the upstream transmitter. Also, the transition from State C7 may return to the appropriate state to allow for uninterrupted operation.

The upstream side must be prepared to implement this stage in parallel with the upstream propagation of topology information if these stages are implemented in parallel by the upstream transmitter.

Transition C7:C8. This transition occurs after RepeaterAuth_Stream_Ready message has been read by the upstream transmitter.

State C8: Authenticated. The upstream side has completed the authentication protocol.

It must perform an ongoing link integrity check as described in Section 2.6. If the upstream side detects a synchronization mismatch between Transmitter and Receiver during the link integrity check, it must set the REAUTH_REQ bit in the *RxStatus* register.

Transition C8:C5. This transition occurs on detection of any changes to the topology.

This transition occurs when a downstream port that was previously in the unauthenticated (State P1) or unconnected (State P0) state transitions in to the authenticated (State F5) state. For example, the transition may occur when a new HDCP Receiver is connected to a downstream port, that previously had no receivers connected, and the downstream port completes the authentication protocol with the newly connected HDCP Receiver.

This transition also occurs when a downstream port that was previously in an authenticated state transitions in to an unauthenticated or unconnected state. For example, the transition may occur when an active, authenticated HDCP Receiver attached to the downstream port is disconnected.

The downstream side of the HDCP Repeater periodically polls the READY bit of *RxStatus* register of the downstream HDCP Repeater. This transition also occurs if the READY bit is set.

Note: Since Link Integrity Check may be implemented in parallel with the upstream propagation of topology information (State C4, State C5 and State C6), the link integrity check process (i.e. State C8) may be implemented asynchronously from the rest of the state diagram. The transition into State C8 may occur from any state for which encryption is currently enabled. Also, the transition from state C8 may return to the appropriate state to allow for undisrupted operation.

The upstream side must be prepared to implement the link integrity check process in parallel with the upstream propagation of topology information if these stages are implemented in parallel by the upstream transmitter.

2.11 Converters

2.11.1 HDCP 2 – HDCP 1.x Converters

HDCP 2 – HDCP 1.x converters are HDCP Repeaters with an HDCP 2 compliant interface port on the upstream (HDCP Receiver) side and one or more HDCP 1.x compliant interface ports on the downstream (HDCP Transmitter) side.

The HDCP 1.x compliant downstream side implements the state diagram explained in the corresponding HDCP 1.x specification (See Section 1.5).

The HDCP 2 compliant upstream side implements the state diagram as explained in Section 2.10.3 with these modifications.

- **State C5: Assemble Receiver ID List.** The upstream side assembles the list of all connected downstream topology HDCP Devices as the downstream HDCP-protected Interface Ports reach terminal states of the authentication protocol. An HDCP-protected Interface Port that advances to the unconnected state or the unauthenticated state does not add to the list. A downstream HDCP-protected Interface Port that arrives in an authenticated state that has an HDCP Receiver that is not an HDCP Repeater connected, adds the *Bksv* of the connected HDCP Receiver to the Receiver ID list. Downstream HDCP-protected Interface Ports that arrive in an authenticated state that have an HDCP Repeater connected will cause the KSV list read from the connected HDCP Repeater, plus the *Bksv* of the connected HDCP Repeater itself, to be added to the list. KSVs are used in place of *Receiver IDs* and are added to the Receiver ID list in big-endian order

When the Receiver ID list (comprising KSVs of connected downstream HDCP 1.x Receivers, where the KSVs are added to the list in big-endian order) for all downstream HDCP Receivers has been assembled, the upstream side computes DEPTH, DEVICE_COUNT and the upstream V' and asserts its READY status indicator in the *RxStatus* register. In the case of a MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED or a MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED error, it asserts the corresponding bits to the upstream transmitter. When an HDCP Repeater receives a MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED or MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED error from a downstream HDCP Repeater, it is required to inform the upstream HDCP Transmitter.




Figure 2.17. HDCP 2 – HDCP 1.x Repeater Protocol Timing with Receiver Attached

| From | To | Max Delay | Conditions and Comments |
|--|---|-----------|---|
| SKE_Send_Eks1 Session Key received from Upstream HDCP Transmitter | AKSV1 HDCP Repeater’s <i>Aksv</i> transmitted downstream | 100 ms | Downstream propagation time. |
| AKSV1 HDCP Repeater’s <i>Aksv</i> transmitted downstream | RDY1 Upstream READY asserted | 200 ms | Upstream propagation time when no downstream HDCP Repeaters are attached (no downstream KSV lists to process) |

Table 2.3. HDCP 2 – HDCP 1.x Repeater Protocol Timing with Receiver Attached




Figure 2.18. HDCP 2 – HDCP 1.x Repeater Protocol Timing with Repeater Attached

| From | To | Max Delay | Conditions and Comments |
|--|---|-----------|--|
| SKE_Send_Eks1 Session Key received from Upstream HDCP Transmitter | AKSV1 HDCP Repeater’s <i>Aksv</i> transmitted downstream | 100 ms | Downstream propagation time. |
| RDY1 Downstream Receiver IDs and topology information received | RDY2 Upstream READY asserted | 200 ms | Upstream propagation time when one or more HDCP 1.x-compliant Repeaters are attached. From latest downstream READY. (downstream KSV lists must be processed) |

Table 2.4. HDCP 2 – HDCP 1.x Repeater Protocol Timing with Repeater Attached

2.11.2 HDCP 1.x – HDCP 2 Converters

HDCP 1.x – HDCP 2 converters are HDCP Repeaters with an HDCP 1.x compliant interface port on the upstream (HDCP Receiver) side and one or more HDCP 2 compliant interface ports on the downstream (HDCP Transmitter) side.

The HDCP 1.x compliant upstream side implements the state diagram explained in the corresponding HDCP 1.x specification (See Section 1.5).

The HDCP 2 compliant downstream side implements the state diagram as explained in Section 2.10.2 with these modifications.

- State F7: Verify Receiver ID List.** If a transition in to this state occurs from State F6, the watchdog timer is cleared. The downstream side reads the RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message. If both MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED and MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED bits are not set, the downstream side computes V and compares the most significant 128-bits of V and V' . The *Receiver IDs* from this port are used in place of KSVs and are added to the KSV list for this HDCP Repeater. KSV list is constructed by appending *Receiver IDs* in little-endian order. The upstream HDCP Transmitter must be informed if topology maximums are exceeded.




Figure 2.19. HDCP 1.x – HDCP 2 Repeater Protocol Timing with Receiver Attached

| From | To | Max Delay | Conditions and Comments |
|--|--|-----------|---|
| AKSV1 Upstream HDCP Transmitter A_{ksv} received | SKE_Send_Eks1 k_s generated by HDCP Repeater transmitted downstream | 400 ms | Downstream propagation time. |
| SKE_Send_Eks1 k_s generated by HDCP Repeater transmitted downstream | RDY1 Upstream READY asserted | 500 ms | Upstream propagation time when no downstream HDCP Repeaters are attached (no downstream Receiver ID lists to process) |

Table 2.5. HDCP 1.x – HDCP 2 Repeater Protocol Timing with Repeater Attached




Figure 2.20. HDCP 1.x – HDCP 2 Repeater Protocol Timing with Repeater Attached

| From | To | Max Delay | Conditions and Comments |
|---|--|-----------|---|
| AKSV1 Upstream HDCP Transmitter A_{ksv} received | SKE_Send_Eks1 k_s generated by HDCP Repeater transmitted downstream | 400 ms | Downstream propagation time. |
| RDY1 READY asserted by downstream repeater | RDY2 Upstream READY asserted | 500 ms | Upstream propagation time when one or more HDCP Repeaters are attached. From latest downstream READY (downstream Receiver ID lists must be processed) |

Table 2.6. HDCP 1.x – HDCP 2 Repeater Protocol Timing with Repeater Attached

2.12 Session Key Validity

When HDCP Encryption is disabled, the transmitter and receiver ceases to perform HDCP Encryption and stops incrementing the *inputCtr*.

If HDCP Encryption was disabled, from its enabled state, due to the detection or loss of HDCP_HPD or authentication failures, the HDCP Transmitter expires the Session Key. The HDCP Transmitter initiates re-authentication with the transmission of a new AKE_Init message. In all other cases, where HDCP Encryption was disabled, from its enabled state, while the link was still active and authenticated (for e.g., HDCP Encryption may be briefly disabled during transmission of low value content), the HDCP Transmitter need not expire the Session Key . The HDCP Transmitter may maintain the encryption parameters used during the HDCP Session i.e. *inputCtr* value after the last HDCP Encryption operation (after which HDCP Encryption was disabled), k_s and r_{iv} . When encryption is re-enabled, HDCP Encryption may be applied seamlessly, without requiring re-authentication, by using the same stored encryption parameters.

If HDCP Encryption was disabled, from its enabled state, the HDCP Receiver must maintain the *inputCtr* value after the last HDCP Encryption operation (after which HDCP Encryption was disabled), k_s and r_{iv} used during the HDCP Session. If encryption was re-enabled, without intervening re-authentication requests from the transmitter, the HDCP Receiver must use the same stored *inputCtr*, k_s and r_{iv} .

2.13 Random Number Generation

Random number generation is required both in the HDCP Transmitter logic and in the HDCP Receiver logic. Counter mode based deterministic random bit generator using AES-128 block cipher specified in NIST SP 800-90 is the recommended random number generator. The minimum entropy requirement for random values that are not used as secret key material (i.e. r_{tx} , r_{rx} , r_{iv} , r_n) is 40 random bits out of 64-bits. This means that a reasonable level of variability or entropy is established if out of 1,000,000 random (r_{tx} , r_{rx} , r_{iv} or r_n) values collected after the first authentication attempt (i.e. after power-up cycles on the HDCP Transmitter or HDCP Receiver logic), the probability of there being any duplicates in this list of 1,000,000 random values is less than 50%.

For randomly generated secret key material (k_m , k_s) the minimum entropy requirement is 128-bits of entropy (i.e. the probability of there being any duplicates in the list of 2^{64} secret values (k_m or k_s) collected after power-up and first authentication attempt on the HDCP Transmitter logic is less than 50%).

A list of possible entropy sources that may be used for generation of random values used as secret key material include

- a true Random Number Generator or analog noise source, even if a poor (biased) one
- a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG), seeded by a true RNG with the required entropy, where the state is stored in non-volatile memory after each use. The state must be kept secret. Flash memory or even disk is usable for this purpose as long as it is secure from tampering.

A list of possible entropy sources that may be used for generation of random values not used as secret key material include

- timers, network statistics, error correction information, radio/cable television signals, disk seek times, etc.
- a reliable (not manipulatable by the user) calendar and time-of-day clock. For example, some broadcast content sources may give reliable date and time information.

2.14 HDCP Port

The values that must be exchanged between the HDCP Transmitter and the HDCP Receiver are communicated over the I²C serial interface of the HDCP-protected Interface. The HDCP Receiver must present a logical device on the I²C bus for each link that it supports. The eight-bit I²C device address (including the read/write bit, “x”) is 0111010x binary, or 0x74 in the usual hexadecimal representation of I²C device addresses where the read/write bit is set to zero. Table 2.7 specifies the address space for this device, which acts only as slave on the I²C bus. No equivalent interface to HDCP Transmitters is specified. The multi-byte value at offset address 0x70 (RxStatus) must be stored in little-endian format. Multi-byte values that are passed through the 1-byte Read_Message (at offset address 0x80) and Write_Message (at offset address 0x60) addresses, as part of the authentication protocol messages (Section 4), must be transferred in big-endian format. For example, the values r_{rx} and $TxCaps$ sent as part of the AKE_Init message, the values cer_{rx} , r_{rx} and $RxCaps$ sent as part of the AKE_Send_Cert message, the value $E_{k_{pub}}k_m$ sent as part of the AKE_No_Stored_km message are all sent in big-endian order.

Master devices may elect to repeat any transfers believed to have previously completed with errors.

For messages which must transfer from the HDCP Receiver to the HDCP Transmitter, the Transmitter must perform polling of the Receiver’s $RxStatus$ register to identify when the message is ready for reading by the Transmitter. A nonzero value in the Message_Size field of the $RxStatus$ register indicates a message is available for reading and its length in bytes (see Table 2.8). The Transmitter may implement frequent polling during the authentication phase in order to identify the availability of messages to be read within the pertinent timeout windows. When in an authenticated state, the HDCP Transmitter polls no less frequently than once per second as specified in the state diagrams.

| Offset (hex) | Name | Size in Bytes | Rd/ Wr | Function |
|--------------|--------------|---------------|--------|---|
| 0x00 | HDCP1.4 | 68 | Rd/ Wr | Reserved for use as specified in HDCP1.4 |
| 0x44 | Rsvd | 12 | Rd | All bytes read as 0x00 |
| 0x50 | HDCP2Version | 1 | Rd | While HPD is asserted, the HDCP Receiver must maintain a valid value for HDCP2Version available for reading by the Transmitter. Bits 7-3: Reserved (must be zero) Bit 2: When set to one, this HDCP Receiver supports HDCP2.2 or higher. Bits 1-0: Reserved (must be zero) |

| | | | | |
|------|-----------------|----|-----------|--|
| 0x51 | Rsvd | 15 | Rd | All bytes read as 0x00 |
| 0x60 | Write_Message | 1 | Wr | The HDCP Transmitter performs write of a variable length message to the HDCP Receiver as a single burst write to this address. Note, there is no auto-increment of the I ² C offset address. |
| 0x61 | Rsvd | 15 | Rd | All bytes read as 0x00 |
| 0x70 | <i>RxStatus</i> | 2 | Rd | See Table 2.8 for description of bits. Bit 15:12: Reserved (must be zero) Bit 11: REAUTH_REQ Bit 10: READY Bits 9-0: Indicates the size in bytes of the message available at the HDCP Receiver for reading by the HDCP Transmitter. |
| 0x72 | Rsvd | 14 | Rd | All bytes read as 0x00 |
| 0x80 | Read_Message | 1 | Rd | The HDCP Transmitter performs read of a variable length message from the HDCP Receiver as a single burst read from this address. Note, there is no auto-increment of the I ² C offset address. The length of the read is determined by the Message_Size value that has been read by the HDCP Transmitter. In the event the HDCP Transmitter reads additional bytes beyond the indicated message size, the HDCP Receiver must stuff the additional bytes with 0 (zero). In the event the HDCP Transmitter stops the single burst read prior to completing the indicated message size, the HDCP Receiver will go to unauthenticated state and await AKE_Init from the HDCP Transmitter. |
| 0x81 | Rsvd | 63 | Rd | All bytes read as 0x00 |
| 0xC0 | dbg | 64 | Rd/ Wr | Implementation-specific debug registers. Confidential values must not be exposed through these registers. |

Table 2.7. Primary Link HDCP Port

| Name | Bit Field | Rd/ Wr | Description |
|--------------|-----------|--------|--|
| Rsvd | 15:12 | Rd | Reserved. Read as zero |
| REAUTH_REQ | 11 | Rd | <p>When set to one, indicates that the upstream side of the HDCP Repeater has transitioned in to an unauthenticated state from State C5, when State C5 is implemented in parallel with State C8, or from State C6 (See Section 2.10.3).</p> <p>This bit is also set to one on a link integrity check failure at the HDCP Receiver (including upstream side of HDCP Repeater).</p> <p>This value must be reset by the HDCP Receiver on every new authentication initiated by the AKE_Init message.</p> |
| READY | 10 | Rd | <p>When set to one, the HDCP Repeater has built the list of downstream Receiver IDs and computed the verification value V'. READY must be reset by the HDCP Repeater as soon as the RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message has been read by the HDCP Transmitter. This value must be reset by the HDCP Repeater on every new authentication request by the HDCP Transmitter as indicated by a write of the AKE_Init message. This value is always zero during the computation of V'. READY bit must be set less than three seconds from the time the transmitter finishes writing the SKE_Send_Eks message parameters, i.e. from the time the last byte of r_{iv} has been written.</p> <p>If a transition in to State C5 occurs from State C8 (See Section 2.10.3), the HDCP Repeater must set READY to one after making the RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message available for the upstream HDCP Transmitter to read then load the Message_Size field with the size of the RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message.</p> |
| Message_Size | 9:0 | Rd | <p>Indicates the size in bytes of the message available at the HDCP Receiver for reading by the HDCP Transmitter, up to 1023 bytes. A value of 0 (zero) indicates there is no message available. The HDCP Receiver must reset this value to 0 (zero) when the HDCP Transmitter initiates a read of the message at the Read_Message address 0x80.</p> |

Table 2.8. RxStatus Register Bit Field Definitions

The HDCP Receivers at these slave addresses respond to I²C accesses as diagrammed in Figure 2.21, Figure 2.22 and Figure 2.23. The nomenclature within these diagrams, and used to describe them, is the same as found in *The I²C Bus Specification Version 2.0*.

Figure 2.21 illustrates a combined-format byte read, in which the master writes a one-byte address to the slave, followed by a repeated start condition (Sr) and the data read. HDCP Devices must support multi-byte reads with auto-increment. For reads from the Read_Message address (see Table 2.7), the bytes will increment through the Read_Message data without incrementing the I²C

offset address. For all other reads, the bytes will increment through the port I2C addresses, reading one byte for each offset. Auto-incremented sequential accesses that start before the Read_Message address and cross through the Read_Message address read only the first byte of the Read_Message and then continue incrementing through the HDCP port address space.




Figure 2.21. HDCP Port Combined-Format Byte Read

Figure 2.22 illustrates a byte write access. For writes to the Write_Message address (see Table 2.7), the bytes will increment through the Write_Message data without incrementing the I2C offset address.




Figure 2.22. HDCP Port Byte Write

The short read format must be supported by all HDCP Receivers and by HDCP Transmitters. This access, shown in Figure 2.23, has an implicit offset address equal to 0x70, the starting location for *RxStatus*. The short read format may be uniquely differentiated from combined reads by tracking STOP conditions (P) on the bus. Short reads must be supported with auto-incrementing addresses.



Figure 2.23. HDCP Port Short Read for *RxStatus*

Minimum frequency to be used by the HDCP Transmitter for the I²C bus transactions must be 50kHz, based on the timeouts specified herein.

3 HDCP Encryption

3.1 Data Encryption

HDCP Encryption is applied at the input to the T.M.D.S. Encoder and decryption is applied at the output of the T.M.D.S. Decoder (Figure 3-1). HDCP Encryption consists of a bit-wise exclusive-or (XOR) of the HDCP Content with a pseudo-random data stream produced by the HDCP Cipher.




Figure 3-1. HDCP Encryption and Decryption

The HDCP Cipher generates a new 128-bit word of the key stream for every five 24-bit pixel values of HDCP Content to be encrypted. The 128 bits of cipher output are applied to the T.M.D.S. channels and across pixels as shown in Table 3.1. As an example, RGB video stream data is also shown in Table 3.1 for Pixel0.

| Cipher Output | Pixel (Pixel0 is 1 st 24-bit pixel value in time) | T.M.D.S. Channel | Video Stream Bits |
|---------------|--|------------------|-------------------|
| 127:120 | <discard> | | |
| 119:96 | Pixel4 | as Pixel0 | as Pixel0 |
| 95:72 | Pixel3 | as Pixel0 | as Pixel0 |
| 71:48 | Pixel2 | as Pixel0 | as Pixel0 |
| 47:24 | Pixel1 | as Pixel0 | as Pixel0 |
| 23:16 | Pixel0 | 2 | Red[7:0] |
| 15:8 | Pixel0 | 1 | Green[7:0] |
| 7:0 | Pixel0 | 0 | Blue[7:0] |

Table 3.1. Encryption Stream Mapping

When transmitting auxiliary data, four auxiliary data bits on each of the two T.M.D.S. channels 1 and 2, plus one auxiliary data bit on channel 0 are encrypted. Nine bits out of 24 bits of the existing HDCP key stream XOR mask are used. Table 3.2 identifies the mappings of HDCP key stream output bits to be XORed with Data Island auxiliary data bits.

| Cipher Output: | Data (Data0 is 1 st 24-bit data value in time) | Auxiliary Data Bits: |
|----------------|---|----------------------|
| 127:120 | <discard> | |
| 119:96 | Data4 | as Data0 |
| 95:72 | Data3 | as Data0 |
| 71:48 | Data2 | as Data0 |
| 47:24 | Data1 | as Data0 |
| 23:20 | Data0 | Unused |
| 19 | Data0 | Channel 2 bit 3 |
| 18 | Data0 | Channel 2 bit 2 |
| 17 | Data0 | Channel 2 bit 1 |
| 16 | Data0 | Channel 2 bit 0 |
| 15:12 | Data0 | Unused |
| 11 | Data0 | Channel 1 bit 3 |
| 10 | Data0 | Channel 1 bit 2 |
| 9 | Data0 | Channel 1 bit 1 |
| 8 | Data0 | Channel 1 bit 0 |
| 7:3 | Data0 | Unused |
| 2 | Data0 | Channel 0 bit 2 |
| 1:0 | Data0 | Unused |

Table 3.2. Encryption Stream Mapping for Data Island Auxiliary Data

3.2 HDCP Cipher

The HDCP cipher consists of a 128-bit AES module that is operated in a Counter (CTR) mode as illustrated in Figure 3-2.




Figure 3-2. HDCP Cipher Structure

k_s is the 128-bit Session Key which is XORed with lc_{128} .

$p = r_{iv} \parallel inputCtr$. All values are in big-endian order.

$inputCtr$ is a 64-bit counter.

$inputCtr = FrameNumber \parallel DataNumber$

FrameNumber is a 38-bit value which indicates the number of encrypted frames since start of HDCP Encryption. FrameNumber increases by 1 (one) at every ENC_EN (corresponds to every frame).

DataNumber is a 26-bit value which increases by one following the generation of every 128-bit block of key stream.

$inputCtr$ is initialized to zero when HDCP Encryption is enabled for the first time during the HDCP Session i.e. at the first encryption enable (ENC_EN) immediately after SKE. FrameNumber must not be reset at any other time. DataNumber is reset to 0 at every ENC_EN (corresponds to at every frame boundary). HDCP Encryption of data symbols begins with an $inputCtr$ value of zero. $inputCtr$ does not change for frames which are not encrypted.

When the HDCP Cipher is clocked, it produces a 128-bit block of key stream and increments the $inputCtr$ following generation of the key stream. The key stream is XORed with the 24-bit data as shown in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2. The value of $inputCtr$ must never be reused for a given set of encryption parameters i.e. k_s and r_{iv} .

3.3 Encryption Status Signaling

The HDCP Transmitter signals the HDCP Receiver to begin decryption of HDCP Content through the previously reserved control signals CTL3, CTL2, CTL1, and CTL0 of the HDCP-protected Interface. Enhanced Encryption Status Signaling (EESS) protocol is used. This protocol is only used when the HDCP Device is in an authenticated state. However, since an HDCP Transmitter may become unauthenticated with no immediate downstream indication, an HDCP Receiver may not be aware of this change and will continue to expect encryption signaling. Therefore it is highly recommended that the HDCP Transmitter not signal frame encryption while in the unauthenticated state. In the case of prior EESS signaling, it is recommended that the encryption-disabled signaling continue (rather than no encryption signaling), ensuring that the HDCP receiver properly displays the blue screen, informative display, or low value content which is sent while the HDCP Transmitter is in an unauthenticated state and the HDCP Receiver is still in an authenticated state. Authenticated states for HDCP Transmitters are State A4 and A5. Authenticated states for HDCP Receivers are State B4. Authenticated states for HDCP Repeaters are State C8 and State F5.

EESS utilizes all four CTLx signals. Two possible CTLx patterns are used to indicate the encryption status of the current frame as described in Table 3.3.

| CTL3: | CTL2: | CTL1: | CTL0: | Description: |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|--|
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Encryption is enabled for this frame. |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Encryption is disabled for this frame. |

Table 3.3. Enhanced Encryption Status Signaling (EESS)

The CTLx signals described in Table 3.3 are only valid within a 16-clock window of opportunity starting at 512 TMDS character clocks following the active edge of VSYNC. When authenticated and not in the HDMI AVMUTE state, the HDCP Transmitter must continually assert one of these CTLx patterns during this window of opportunity. The CTLx signals may be used for other purposes outside of this window of opportunity. See timing in Figure D.1 Appendix D.

The state transition signal ENC_EN is true at the end of this window of opportunity if the encryption enable value is transmitted during the window. The state transition signal ENC_DIS is true at the end of this window of opportunity if the encryption disabled value is transmitted during this window. Neither signal is activated otherwise or elsewhere.

The specific methods an HDCP Receiver uses to determine which of the two signals, ENC_EN or ENC_DIS, is presented, in consideration of environments where signaling errors may occur, are left to the implementation. The HDCP Receiver may also use heuristics based on common usage in its decision, such as assuming that the frame has the same encryption status as the previous frame.

The active edge of VSYNC is either a rising or falling edge. For the purposes of the signaling described above, the HDCP Transmitter and Receiver determine which edge is active by polling VSYNC at the start of the previous Video Data Period. If VSYNC is low at this point, then the active edge of VSYNC is defined as a rising edge. If VSYNC is high at this point, then the active edge of VSYNC is defined as a falling edge. Upon removal or connection of an HDCP Device, the active edge of VSYNC must default to the falling edge. In addition, following a VSYNC active edge, no subsequent VSYNC edge may be considered active until a Video Data Period occurs. This VSYNC polarity determination is not specified as used for any other purpose than to establish the position of the encryption signaling window position.

It is required that no Data Island or Video Data, nor any Guard Band, be transmitted during a keep-out period that starts 508 TMDS character clocks past the active edge of VSYNC and ends 650 TMDS character clocks past the active edge of VSYNC. See timing Figure D.1 in Appendix D.

Figure 3-3 illustrates the encryption function using EESS as they relate to HSYNC, VSYNC, Video Data, Packet Data, and Encryption Status Signaling (ENC_EN, ENC_DIS). This diagram is applicable to both HDCP Transmitters and HDCP Receivers.

HDMI transmits data during Video Data Periods and Data Island Periods. All of this data requires HDCP Encryption.

Video Data Periods begin with a two-character Leading Guard Band. The state transition variable videoData is defined to go TRUE on the TMDS character clock coinciding with the first active pixel (or portion of the pixel bits when the pixel bit depth is higher than 24 bits per pixel) of video data in the period (i.e. after the Guard Band) and is defined to go FALSE on the first TMDS character clock following the last active pixel of video data in the period. (NOTE: When the pixel bit depth is higher than 24 bits per pixel, a single pixel data straddles multiple TMDS character clock cycles). There is no Trailing Guard Band on a Video Data Period.

Data Islands begin with a two-character Leading Guard Band and end with a two-character Trailing Guard Band. Between the Guard Bands, packet data is transmitted. Unlike the 8 to 10 bit encoding used for video pixel data, each pixel of the packet data is encoded using T.M.D.S. Error Reduction Coding (TERC4) performing a 4 to 10 bit conversion of the input packet data to the 10 bits required for differential transmission on each of the three T.M.D.S. channels. The state transition variable packetData is defined to go TRUE for the first TMDS character clock of the Data Island containing packet data (i.e. first TMDS character clock following the Leading Guard Band) and is defined to go FALSE following the last TMDS character clock containing packet data (i.e. the first TMDS character clock of the Trailing Guard Band).

The HDMI Specification defines a facility for the HDCP Transmitter to inform the HDCP Receiver that the streams being transmitted contain no useful visual or aural information and should be muted. HDCP uses this mechanism to provide a means of temporarily disabling HDCP Encryption while remaining authenticated. During the AVMUTE state, an HDCP Transmitter is

required to not assert any ENC_EN signal. Also during the AVMUTE state, the HDCP Receiver should ignore Encryption Status Signaling and operate as if ENC_DIS is asserted.

This mechanism can be applied in the case of an erratic or changing pixel clock that may result from a change from one video format to another, such as from an SDTV (27MHz) signal to an HDTV (74.25MHz) signal. If the pixel clock change were preceded by a Set_AVMUTE request and followed by a Clear_AVMUTE request, then authentication would not be affected.

The state transition signal AVMUTE is defined to be TRUE for a duration of one TMDS character clock coincident with the assertion of ENC_EN or ENC_DIS if the HDCP Device is in an AVMUTE state, as defined in the HDMI Specification.




Figure 3-3. Encryption/Decryption State Diagram (EESS)

Transition Any State:G0. Reset conditions or transitions into the unauthenticated state at the HDCP Device cause the encryption state machine to transition to the idle state.

State G0: Idle. The HDCP Cipher is not in use.

Transition G0:G1. The assertion/detection of Encryption Enable (ENC_EN) when the HDCP Device is authenticated indicates that all of the video and auxiliary data until the next Encryption Status Signaling will be encrypted.

State G1: Update *inputCtr*. *inputCtr* is initialized to zero at the first encryption enable (ENC_EN) immediately after SKE. Subsequently, the FrameNumber field of *inputCtr* is incremented and the DataNumber field of *inputCtr* is reset to 0(zero) at every ENC_EN; this new value for *inputCtr* must be ready within 118 TMDs character clocks after the assertion of ENC_EN. It is required that no Data Island or Video Data, nor any Guard Band, be transmitted during a keep-out period that starts 508 TMDs character clocks following VSYNC and ends 118 TMDs character clocks past the assertion of ENC_EN. See timing diagram D-1 in Appendix D.

Transitions G1:G2 and G3:G2. Entering the valid data period of a video data period signals the beginning of video data encryption.

State G2: Encrypt/Decrypt Video. In this state HDCP Devices encrypt/decrypt 24-bit pixel values.

Transition G2:G3. The end of video pixel data is signaled by !videoData.

State G3: Unknown Blank. No HDCP activity occurs during this state.

Transition G3:G1. The occurrence of an Encryption Enable signal (ENC_EN) when AVMUTE is false indicates that all of the data until the next Encryption Status Signaling will be encrypted.

Transitions G1:G2' and G3:G2'. Entering the packet data period of a Data Island period signals the beginning of auxiliary data encryption.

State G2': Encrypt/Decrypt Data Island. In this state HDCP Devices encrypt/decrypt auxiliary data.

Transition G2':G3. The end of Data Island packet data is signaled by !packetData.

Transition G3:G0. If Encryption Disable Signaling (ENC_DIS) occurs, or when AVMUTE is true, then encryption has been disabled for the next frame.

3.4 Uniqueness of k_s and r_{iv}

HDCP Receivers and HDCP Repeaters with multiple inputs may share the same Public Key Certificates and Private Keys across all inputs. The HDCP Transmitter (including downstream side of HDCP Repeater) must negotiate distinct k_m with each directly connected downstream HDCP Device. While r_{tx} used during each HDCP Session is required to be fresh, transmitters with multiple downstream HDCP links must ensure that each link receives a distinct r_{tx} value.

As illustrated in Figure 3-4, HDCP Transmitters, including downstream side of HDCP Repeaters, with multiple downstream HDCP links may share the same k_s and r_{iv} across those links only if HDCP Content from the same HDCP Cipher module following all the requirements specified in Section 3.2 is transmitted to those links.




Figure 3-4. k_s and r_{iv} Shared across HDCP Links

4 Authentication Protocol Messages

4.1 Overview

Message parameters are specified in the order that they are read or written by the HDCP Transmitter. For example, in the case of the AKE_Init message, the transmitter first writes the r_{tx} parameter to the receiver followed by $TxCaps$. In the case of the AKE_Send_Cert message, the transmitter first reads the $cert_{rx}$ parameter followed by r_{rx} and finally $RxCaps$.

4.2 Message Format

4.2.1 AKE_Init (Write)

| Syntax | No. of Bytes |
|-----------------|--------------|
| AKE_Init { | |
| msg_id (=2) | 1 |
| $r_{tx}[63..0]$ | 8 |
| $TxCaps$ | 3 |
| } | |

Table 4.1. AKE_Init Format

| Name | Bit Field | Rd/ Wr | Description |
|-----------------------------|-----------|--------|---|
| VERSION | 23:16 | Wr | The HDCP Transmitter must set VERSION to 0x02 |
| TRANSMITTER_CAPABILITY_MASK | 15:0 | Wr | Reserved. Read as zero |

Table 4.2. $TxCaps$ Register Bit Field Definitions

4.2.2 AKE_Send_Cert (Read)

The HDCP Transmitter attempts to read AKE_Send_Cert beginning with $cert_{rx}$ within 100 ms after writing the AKE_Init message i.e. after the last byte of $TxCaps$ has been written.

| Syntax | No. of Bytes |
|----------------------|--------------|
| AKE_Send_Cert { | |
| msg_id (=3) | 1 |
| $cert_{rx}[4175..0]$ | 522 |
| $r_{rx}[63..0]$ | 8 |
| $RxCaps$ | 3 |
| } | |

Table 4.3. AKE_Send_Cert Format

| Name | Bit Field | Rd/Wr | Description |
|--------------------------|-----------|-------|---|
| VERSION | 23:16 | Rd | The HDCP Receiver must set VERSION to 0x02 |
| RECEIVER_CAPABILITY_MASK | 15:2 | Rd | Reserved. Read as zero |
| Rsvd | 1 | Rd | Reserved. Read as zero |
| REPEATER | 0 | Rd | When set to one, this HDCP Receiver supports downstream connections as permitted by the Digital Content Protection LLC license. This bit does not change while the HDCP Receiver is active. |

Table 4.4. RxCaps Register Bit Field Definitions

4.2.3 AKE_No_Stored_km (Write)

| Syntax | No. of Bytes |
|---|---------------------|
| <pre> AKE_No_Stored_km { msg_id (=4) E_{kpub}_k_m[1023..0] } </pre> | <p>1</p> <p>128</p> |

Table 4.5. AKE_No_Stored_km Format

4.2.4 AKE_Stored_km (Write)

| Syntax | No. of Bytes |
|--|------------------------------|
| <pre> AKE_Stored_km{ msg_id (=5) E_{kh}_k_m[127..0] m[127..0] } </pre> | <p>1</p> <p>16</p> <p>16</p> |

Table 4.6. AKE_Stored_km Format

4.2.5 AKE_Send_H_prime (Read)

AKE_Send_H_prime must be available for the transmitter to read within one second after writing the AKE_No_Stored_km message i.e. after the last byte of $E_{kpub_k_m}$ has been written or within 200 ms after writing the AKE_Stored_km message i.e. after the last byte of m has been written.

| Syntax | No. of Bytes |
|--|--------------------|
| <pre> AK_Send_H_prime{ msg_id (=7) H [255..0] } </pre> | <p>1</p> <p>32</p> |

Table 4.7. AKE_Send_H_prime Format

4.2.6 AKE_Send_Pairing_Info (Read)

AKE_Send_Pairing_Info must be available for the transmitter to read within 200 ms from the time the transmitter finishes writing the AKE_Send_H_prime message parameters to the HDCP Receiver i.e. after the last byte of H' has been written

| Syntax | No. of Bytes |
|--|-----------------|
| <pre> AKE_Send_Pairing_Info{ msg_id (=8) E_{kh}_k_m[127..0] } </pre> | <p>1 16</p> |

Table 4.8. AKE_Send_Pairing_Info Format

4.2.7 LC_Init (Write)

| Syntax | No. of Bytes |
|---|----------------|
| <pre> LC_Init { msg_id (=9) r_n[63..0] } </pre> | <p>1 8</p> |

Table 4.9. LC_Init Format

4.2.8 LC_Send_L_prime (Read)

The LC_Send_L_prime message must be available for the transmitter to read within 20 ms from the time the transmitter finishes writing the LC_Init message parameters to the HDCP Receiver i.e. after the last byte of r_n has been written.

| Syntax | No. of Bytes |
|---|-----------------|
| <pre> LC_Send_L_prime{ msg_id (=10) L [255..0] } </pre> | <p>1 32</p> |

Table 4.10. LC_Send_L_prime Format

4.2.9 SKE_Send_Eks (Write)

| Syntax | No. of Bytes |
|--|-----------------------|
| <pre> SKE_Send_Eks{ msg_id (=11) E_{dkey}_k_s[127..0] r_{iv}[63..0] } </pre> | <p>1 16 8</p> |

Table 4.11. SKE_Send_Eks Format

4.2.10 RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List (Read)

Receiver ID list is constructed by appending *Receiver IDs* in big-endian order.

Receiver ID list = $Receiver\ ID_0 \parallel Receiver\ ID_1 \parallel \dots \parallel Receiver\ ID_{n-1}$, where n is the DEVICE_COUNT.

If the computed DEVICE_COUNT for an HDCP Repeater exceeds 31, the repeater sets the *RxInfo*.MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED bit to one. If the computed DEPTH for an HDCP Repeater exceeds four, the repeater sets *RxInfo*.MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED bit to one. If topology maximums are not exceeded, *RxInfo*.MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED and *RxInfo*.MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED are set to zero.

The HDCP Repeater sets *RxInfo*.HDCP2_LEGACY_DEVICE_DOWNSTREAM bit to one if an HDCP 2.0-compliant Device or HDCP 2.1-compliant Device is attached to any one of its downstream ports, else it sets *RxInfo*.HDCP2_LEGACY_DEVICE_DOWNSTREAM to zero.

The HDCP Repeater sets *RxInfo*.HDCP1_DEVICE_DOWNSTREAM to one if an HDCP 1.x-compliant Device i.e. an HDCP 1.x-compliant Receiver or an HDCP 1.x-compliant Repeater is attached to any one of its downstream port, else it sets *RxInfo*.HDCP1_DEVICE_DOWNSTREAM to zero.

When the HDCP Repeater receives HDCP2_LEGACY_DEVICE_DOWNSTREAM or HDCP1_DEVICE_DOWNSTREAM bits that are set from a downstream HDCP Repeater, it must propagate this information to the upstream HDCP Transmitter by setting the corresponding bits in the RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List message.

| Syntax | No. of Bytes |
|--|----------------|
| RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List{ | |
| msg_id (=12) | 1 |
| <i>RxInfo</i> | 2 |
| If (MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED != 1 && MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED != 1){ | |
| seq_num_V | 3 |
| V[255..128] | 16 |
| Receiver ID List | 5*DEVICE_COUNT |
| } | |

Table 4.12. RepeaterAuth_Send_ReceiverID_List Format

| Name | Bit Field | Rd/ Wr | Description |
|--------------------------------|-----------|--------|--|
| Rsvd | 15:12 | Rd | Reserved. Read as zero |
| DEPTH | 11:9 | Rd | Repeater cascade depth. This value gives the number of attached levels through the connection topology. |
| DEVICE_COUNT | 8:4 | Rd | Total number of attached downstream devices. Always zero for HDCP Receivers. This count does not include the HDCP Repeater itself, but only devices downstream from the HDCP Repeater. |
| MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED | 3 | Rd | Topology error indicator. When set to one, more than 31 downstream devices are attached. |
| MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED. | 2 | Rd | Topology error indicator. When set to one, more than four levels of repeaters have been cascaded together. |
| HDCP2_LEGACY_DEVICE_DOWNSTREAM | 1 | Rd | When set to one, indicates presence of an HDCP2.0-compliant Device or HDCP 2.1-compliant Device in the topology |
| HDCP1_DEVICE_DOWNSTREAM | 0 | Rd | When set to one, indicates presence of an HDCP 1.x-compliant Device in the topology |

Table 4.13. RxInfo Register Bit Field Definitions

4.2.11 RepeaterAuth_Send_Ack (Write)

The last byte of the RepeaterAuth_Send_Ack message i.e the last byte of V'[127..0] must be written to the repeater by the transmitter within two seconds from the time the READY status was asserted by the HDCP Repeater and the downstream topology does not exceed specified maximums.

| Syntax | No. of Bytes |
|--|--------------|
| RepeaterAuth_Send_Ack{ msg_id (=15) V[127..0] } | 1 16 |

Table 4.14. RepeaterAuth_Send_Ack Format

4.2.12 RepeaterAuth_Stream_Manage (Write)

The Content Stream is assigned a Type value by the most upstream HDCP Transmitter based on instructions received from the Upstream Content Control Function.

The STREAM_ID, assigned to the Content Stream, is followed by its assigned Type value in the RepeaterAuth_Stream_Manage message.

| Syntax | No. of Bytes |
|---|--------------------|
| RepeaterAuth_Stream_Manage{ msg_id (=16) seq_num_M k StreamID_Type } | 1 3 2 2*k |

Table 4.15. RepeaterAuth_Stream_Manage Format

StreamID_Type = STREAM_ID || Type

STREAM_ID assigned to the Content Stream is concatenated with its assigned Type value. All values are in big-endian order.

Parameter *k* is the number of Content Streams that are being transmitted by the HDCP Transmitter to the attached HDCP Repeater during the HDCP Session. This value is always set to 0x0001 by the HDCP Transmitter.

| Parameter | No. of Bytes | Description |
|-----------|--------------|--|
| STREAM_ID | 1 | Stream Identifier, assigned to the Content Stream. This value must always be set to 0 (zero) |
| Type | 1 | 0x00 : Type 0 Content Stream. May be transmitted by the HDCP Repeater to all HDCP Devices. 0x01 : Type 1 Content Stream. Must not be transmitted by the HDCP Repeater to HDCP 1.x-compliant Devices, HDCP 2.0-compliant Devices and HDCP 2.1-compliant Devices. 0x02 – 0xFF : Reserved for future use only. Content Streams with reserved Type values must be treated similar to Type 1 Content Streams |

Table 4.16. STREAM_ID, Type Description

4.2.13 RepeaterAuth_Stream_Ready (Read)

The RepeaterAuth_Stream_Ready message must be available for the transmitter to read within 100 ms from the time the transmitter finishes writing the RepeaterAuth_Stream_Manage message parameters to the HDCP Receiver i.e. after the last byte of *StreamID_Type* has been written.

| Syntax | No. of Bytes |
|---|--------------|
| RepeaterAuth_Stream_Ready{ msg_id (=17) M'[255..0] } | 1 32 |

Table 4.17. RepeaterAuth_Stream_Ready Format

5 Renewability

It is contemplated that an authorized participant in the authentication protocol may become compromised so as to expose the RSA private keys it possesses for misuse by unauthorized parties. In consideration of this, each HDCP Receiver is issued a unique Receiver ID which is contained in *cert_{r,x}*. Through a process defined in the HDCP Adopter's License, the Digital Content Protection LLC may determine that an HDCP Receiver's RSA private key, *kpriv_{r,x}*, has been compromised. If so, it places the corresponding Receiver ID on a revocation list that the HDCP Transmitter checks during authentication.

The HDCP Transmitter is required to manage system renewability messages (SRMs) carrying the Receiver ID revocation list. The validity of an SRM is established by verifying the integrity of its signature with the Digital Content Protection LLC public key, which is specified by the Digital Content Protection LLC.

For interoperability with HDCP 1.x, KSVs of revoked HDCP 1.x devices will be included in the HDCP 2 SRM, in addition to the HDCP 1.x SRM. Similarly, Receiver IDs of revoked HDCP 2 devices will be included in the HDCP 1.x SRM, in addition to the HDCP 2 SRM.

The SRMs are delivered with content and must be checked when available. The Receiver IDs must immediately be checked against the SRM when a new version of the SRM is received. Additionally, devices compliant with HDCP 2.0 and higher must be capable of storing at least 5kB of the SRM in their non-volatile memory. The process by which a device compliant with HDCP 2.0 or higher updates the SRM stored in its non-volatile storage when presented with a newer SRM version is explained in Section 5.2.

5.1 SRM Size and Scalability




Figure 5.1. SRM Generational Format

As illustrated in Figure 5.1, the size of the First-Generation HDCP SRM will be limited to a maximum of 5kB. The actual size of the First-Generation SRM is 5116 bytes. For scalability of the SRM, the SRM format supports next-generation extensions. By supporting generations of SRMs, an HDCP SRM can, if required in future, grow beyond the 5kB limit to accommodate more Receiver IDs. Next-generation extensions are appended to the current-generation SRM in order to ensure backward compatibility with devices that support only previous-generation SRMs.

Table 5.1 gives the format of the HDCP 2 SRM. All values are stored in big endian format.

| Name | Size (bits) | Function |
|--------|-------------|--|
| SRM ID | 4 | A value of 0x9 signifies that the message is for HDCP 2. All other |

| | | |
|-----------------------|--|---|
| | | values are reserved. SRMs with values other than 0x9 must be ignored. |
| HDCP2 Indicator | 4 | A value of 0x1 signifies that the message is for HDCP2 |
| Reserved | 8 | Reserved for future definition. Must be 0x00 |
| SRM Version | 16 | Sequentially increasing unique SRM numbers. Higher numbered SRMs are more recent |
| SRM Generation Number | 8 | Indicates the generation of the SRM. The generation number starts at 1 and increases sequentially |
| Length | 24 | Length in bytes and includes the combined size of this field (three bytes) and all following fields contained in the first-generation SRM i.e. size of this field, Number of Devices field, Reserved (22 bits) field, Device IDs field and Digital Content Protection LLC signature field (384 bytes) in the first-generation SRM |
| Number of Devices | 10 | Specifies the number (N1) of Receiver IDs / KSVs contained in the first-generation SRM |
| Reserved | 22 | Reserved for future definition. All bits set to 0 |
| Device IDs | 40 * N1 Max size for this field is 37760 (4720 bytes) | 40-bit Receiver IDs / KSVs |
| DCP LLC Signature | 3072 | A cryptographic signature calculated over all preceding fields of the SRM. RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 is the signature scheme used as defined by PKCS #1 V2.1: RSA Cryptography Standard. SHA-256 is the underlying hash function |

Table 5.1. System Renewability Message Format

Each subsequent next-generation extensions to the first-generation SRM will have the following fields.

| Name | Size (bits) | Function |
|-------------------|-------------|--|
| Length | 16 | Length in bytes and includes the combined size of this field (two bytes) and all following fields contained in this next-generation extension i.e. size of this field, Number of Devices field, Reserved (6 bits) field, Device IDs field and Digital Content Protection LLC signature field (384 bytes) in this next-generation SRM |
| Reserved | 6 | Reserved for future definition. All bits set to 0 |
| Number of Devices | 10 | Specifies the number (N2) of Receiver IDs / KSVs contained in this next generation extension |
| Device IDs | 40 * N2 | 40-bit Receiver IDs / KSVs |
| DCP LLC Signature | 3072 | A cryptographic signature calculated over all preceding fields of the SRM. RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 is the signature scheme used as defined by PKCS #1 V2.1: RSA Cryptography Standard. SHA-256 is the underlying hash function |

Table 5.2. Next-generation extension format

5.2 Updating SRMs

The stored HDCP SRM must be updated when a newer version of the SRM is delivered with the content. The procedure for updating an SRM is as follows:

1. Verify that the version number of the new SRM is greater than the version number of the SRM currently stored in the device's non-volatile storage
2. Verify the signature on the new SRM

On successful signature verification, replace the current SRM in the device's non-volatile storage with the new SRM if the version number of the new SRM is greater than the version number of the current SRM. If, for instance, the device supports only second-generation SRMs and the new SRM is a third-generation SRM, the device is not required to store the third-generation extension. Devices compliant with HDCP 2.0 or higher must be capable of storing at least 5kB (actual size is 5116 bytes) of the SRM (First-Generation SRM).

Appendix A. Core Functions and Confidentiality and Integrity of Values

Table A.1 identifies the requirements of confidentiality and integrity for values within the protocol. A *confidential* value must never be revealed. The *integrity* of many values in the system is protected by fail-safe mechanisms of the protocol. Values that are not protected in this manner require active measures beyond the protocol to ensure integrity. Such values are noted in the table as requiring integrity. Core Functions must be implemented in Hardware. The values used by Core Functions, along with the corresponding Core Functions by which they are used, are identified in the table.

| Value | Confidentiality Required [±] ? | Integrity Required [±] ? | Value used by Core Functions? | Core Function |
|------------------|---|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------|--|
| lc_{128} | Yes | Yes | Yes | HDCP Encryption and Decryption |
| $k_{pub_{dep}}$ | No | Yes | No | N/A |
| $cert_{rx}$ | No | No | No | N/A |
| $k_{pub_{rx}}$ | No | Yes | No | N/A |
| Receiver ID | No | Yes | No | N/A |
| $k_{priv_{tx}}$ | Yes | Yes | Yes | Handling of Device Secret Key, during AKE, in plaintext form |
| r_{tx} | No | Yes* | Yes | |
| r_{iv} | No | Yes* | Yes | N/A |
| REPEATER | No | Yes | No | N/A |
| r_{rx} | No | Yes** | Yes | N/A |
| k_m | Yes | Yes* | Yes | Handling of Master Key, during AKE (including Pairing) and Key Derivation, in plaintext form |
| k_d | Yes | Yes* | No | N/A |
| $dkey_0, dkey_1$ | Yes | Yes* | No | N/A |

[±] According to the robustness rules in the HDCP Adopter's License

* Only within the transmitter

** Only within the receiver

** Only within the receiver

| | | | | |
|-------------------|-----|------|-----|--|
| dkey ₂ | Yes | Yes* | Yes | Handling of information or materials during Key Derivation and SKE, including but not limited to cryptographic keys used to encrypt or decrypt HDCP Core Keys (k_s), from which HDCP Core Keys could reasonably be derived |
| ctr | No | Yes* | Yes | N/A |
| H | Yes | Yes | No | N/A |
| H' | No | No | No | N/A |
| m | No | No | Yes | N/A |
| k _h | Yes | Yes | Yes | Handling of information or materials during Pairing, including but not limited to cryptographic keys used to encrypt or decrypt HDCP Core Keys (k_m), from which HDCP Core Keys could reasonably be derived |
| r _n | No | Yes* | Yes | N/A |
| L | Yes | Yes | No | N/A |
| L' | No | No | No | N/A |
| k _s | Yes | Yes* | Yes | Handling of Session Key, during SKE and HDCP Encryption/Decryption, in plaintext form |
| V[255:128] | Yes | Yes | No | N/A |
| V'[127:0] | Yes | Yes | No | N/A |
| V[127:0] | No | No | No | N/A |
| V'[255:128] | No | No | No | N/A |
| Receiver ID list | No | Yes | No | N/A |
| DEPTH | No | Yes | No | N/A |
| DEVICE_COUNT | No | Yes | No | N/A |
| MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED | No | Yes | No | N/A |

| | | | | |
|------------------------------|-----|------|-----|--------------------------------|
| MAX_CASCA DE_EXCEEDE D | No | Yes | No | N/A |
| <i>inputCtr</i> | No | Yes* | Yes | HDCP Encryption and Decryption |
| <i>p</i> | No | Yes* | Yes | HDCP Encryption and Decryption |
| <i>M</i> | Yes | Yes | No | N/A |
| <i>M'</i> | No | No | No | N/A |

Table A.1. Core Functions and Confidentiality and Integrity of Values

Appendix B. DCP LLC Public Key

Table B.1 gives the production DCP LLC public key.

| Parameter | Value (hexadecimal) | |
|-----------|---|----|
| Modulus n | B0E9 AA45 F129 BA0A 1CBE 1757 28EB 2B4E | |
| | 8FD0 C06A AD79 980F 8D43 8D47 04B8 2BF4 | |
| | 1521 5619 0140 013B D091 9062 9E89 C227 | |
| | 8ECF B6DB CE3F 7210 5093 8C23 2983 7B80 | |
| | 64A7 59E8 6167 4CBC D858 B8F1 D4F8 2C37 | |
| | 9816 260E 4EF9 4EEE 24DE CCD1 4B4B C506 | |
| | 7AFB 4965 E6C0 0083 481E 8E42 2A53 A0F5 | |
| | 3729 2B5A F973 C59A A1B5 B574 7C06 DC7B | |
| | 7CDC 6C6E 826B 4988 D41B 25E0 EED1 79BD | |
| | 3985 FA4F 25EC 7019 23C1 B9A6 D97E 3EDA | |
| | 48A9 58E3 1814 1E9F 307F 4CA8 AE53 2266 | |
| | 2BBE 24CB 4766 FC83 CF5C 2D1E 3AAB AB06 | |
| | BE05 AA1A 9B2D B7A6 54F3 632B 97BF 93BE | |
| | C1AF 2139 490C E931 90CC C2BB 3C02 C4E2 | |
| | BDBD 2F84 639B D2DD 783E 90C6 C5AC 1677 | |
| | 2E69 6C77 FDED 8A4D 6A8C A3A9 256C 21FD | |
| | B294 0C84 AA07 2926 46F7 9B3A 1987 E09F | |
| | EB30 A8F5 64EB 07F1 E9DB F9AF 2C8B 697E | |
| | 2E67 393F F3A6 E5CD DA24 9BA2 7872 F0A2 | |
| | 27C3 E025 B4A1 046A 5980 27B5 DAB4 B453 | |
| | 973B 2899 ACF4 9627 0F7F 300C 4AAF CB9E | |
| | D871 2824 3EBC 3515 BE13 EBAF 4301 BD61 | |
| | 2454 349F 733E B510 9FC9 FC80 E84D E332 | |
| | 968F 8810 2325 F3D3 3E6E 6DBB DC29 66EB | |
| | Public Exponent e | 03 |

Table B.1. DCP LLC Public Key

Appendix C. Bibliography (Informative)

These documents are not normatively referenced in this specification, but may provide useful supplementary information.

ITU-T Recommendation H.222.0 / ISO/IEC 13818-1 (2006) Amendment 1 (Jan. 2007), *Transport of MPEG-4 streaming text and MPEG-4 lossless audio over MPEG-2 systems*

ITU-T Recommendation H.222.0 / ISO/IEC 13818-1 (2006) Amendment 2 (Aug. 2007), *Carriage of auxiliary video data*

SMPTE 2022-1-2007, *Forward Error Correction for Real-Time Video/Audio Transport Over IP Networks*, May 2007

SMPTE 2022-2-2007, *Unidirectional Transport of Constant Bit Rate MPEG-2 Transport Streams on IP Networks*, May 2007

Interoperability for Professional Video Streaming over IP Networks, SMPTE Motion Imaging Journal, Feb./March 2005,
<http://www.broadcastpapers.com/whitepapers/Path1InteropVideoIP.pdf?CFID=16660544&CFTOKEN=dd0a39cb99517fc5-3203F7CF-F879-0B3E-45C4A402626C372C>

Appendix D. Timing Diagram




Figure D.1. Timing

Appendix E. Test Vectors

5.3 Facsimile Keys

Note: The facsimile keys provided must be used ONLY for test purposes.

All values are provided in big-endian order.

Table E.1 provides facsimile key information for transmitter T1.

| | Value in Hex |
|----------------------------|--|
| Global Constant lc_{128} | 93 ce 5a 56 a0 a1 f4 f7 3c 65 8a 1b d2 ae f0 f7 |

Table E.1

Table E.2 provides the facsimile public parameters associated with the DCP LLC key $k_{pub_{dcp}}$. These parameters are used only for test purposes. They are not used in production devices or SRMs.

| | Value in Hex |
|-----------|--|
| Modulus n |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|

| | |
|-------------------|---|
| | 7A 24 DD D1 3A B7 3A B0 BB E5 D1 28 AB AD 24 54 72 0E 76 D2 89 32 EA 46 D3 78 D0 A9 67 78 C1 2D 18 B0 33 DE DB 27 CC B0 7C C9 A4 BD DF 2B 64 10 32 44 06 81 21 B3 BA CF 33 85 49 1E 86 4C BD F2 3D 34 EF D6 23 7A 9F 2C DA 84 F0 83 83 71 7D DA 6E 44 96 CD 1D 05 DE 30 F6 1E 2F 9C 99 9C 60 07 |
| Public Exponent e | 03 |

Table E.2

Table E.3 and Table E.4 provide the facsimile certificates ($cert_{rx}$) for receivers R1 and R2.

As provided in Table 2.1 of High-bandwidth Digital Content Protection System, Revision 2.2, Mapping HDCP to HDMI specification, the certificate format consists of 40-bit Receiver ID, followed by 1048-bit Receiver Public Key, 4-bit Reserved2, 12-bit Reserved1 and 3072-bit Signature fields. All values are stored in big-endian format.

For example, in Table E.3, 0x745bb8bd04 is the Receiver ID which is followed by Receiver Public Key, Reserved2, Reserved1 and Signature fields.

| | Value (Sequence of Hexadecimal bytes) for R1 |
|-----------------------------|--|
| Certificate ($cert_{rx}$) | 74 5b b8 bd 04 af b5 c5 c6 7b c5 3a 34 90 a9 54 c0 8f b7 eb a1 54 d2 4f 22 de 83 f5 03 a6 c6 68 46 9b c0 b8 c8 6c db 26 f9 3c 49 2f 02 e1 71 df 4e f3 0e c8 bf 22 9d 04 cf bf a9 0d ff 68 ab 05 6f 1f 12 8a 68 62 eb fe c9 ea 9f a7 fb 8c ba b1 bd 65 ac 35 9c a0 33 b1 dd a6 05 36 af 00 a2 7f bc 07 b2 dd b5 cc 57 5c dc c0 95 50 e5 ff 1f 20 db 59 46 fa 47 c4 ed 12 2e 9e 22 bd 95 a9 85 59 a1 59 3c c7 83 01 00 01 10 00 0b a3 73 77 dd 03 18 03 8a 91 63 29 1e a2 95 74 42 90 78 d0 67 25 b6 32 2f cc 23 2b ad 21 39 3d 14 ba 37 a3 65 14 6b 9c cf 61 20 44 a1 07 bb cf c3 4e 95 5b 10 cf c7 6f f1 c3 53 7c 63 a1 8c b2 e8 ab 2e 96 97 c3 83 99 70 d3 dc 21 41 f6 0a d1 1a ee f4 cc eb fb a6 aa b6 9a af 1d 16 5e e2 83 a0 4a 41 f6 7b 07 bf 47 85 28 6c a0 77 a6 a3 d7 85 a5 c4 a7 e7 6e b5 1f 40 72 97 fe c4 81 23 a0 c2 90 b3 49 24 f5 b7 90 2c bf fe 04 2e 00 a9 5f 86 04 ca c5 3a cc 26 d9 39 7e a9 2d 28 6d c0 cc 6e 81 9f b9 b7 11 33 32 23 47 98 43 0d a5 1c 59 f3 cd d2 4a b7 3e 69 d9 21 53 9a f2 6e 77 62 ae 50 da 85 c6 aa c4 b5 1c cd a8 a5 dd 6e 62 73 |

| |
|--|
| ff 5f 7b d7 3c 17 ba 47 0c 89 0e 62 79 43 94 |
| aa a8 47 f4 4c 38 89 a8 81 ad 23 13 27 0c 17 |
| cf 3d 83 84 57 36 e7 22 26 2e 76 fd 56 80 83 |
| f6 70 d4 5c 91 48 84 7b 18 db 0e 15 3b 49 26 |
| 23 e6 a3 e2 c6 3a 23 57 66 b0 72 b8 12 17 4f |
| 86 fe 48 0d 53 ea fe 31 48 7d 86 de eb 82 86 |
| 1e 62 03 98 59 00 37 eb 61 e9 f9 7a 40 78 1c |
| ba bc 0b 88 fb fd 9d d5 01 11 94 e0 35 be 33 |
| e8 e5 36 fb 9c 45 cb 75 af d6 35 ff 78 92 7f |
| a1 7c a8 fc b7 f7 a8 52 a9 c6 84 72 3d 1c c9 |
| df 35 c6 e6 00 e1 48 72 ce 83 1b cc f8 33 2d |
| 4f 98 75 00 3c 41 df 7a ed 38 53 b1 |

Table E.3

| | Value (Sequence of Hexadecimal bytes) for R2 |
|--|---|
| Certificate (<i>cert_{rx}</i>) | 8b a4 47 42 fb e4 68 63 8a da 97 2d de 9a 8d 1c |
| | b1 65 4b 85 8d e5 46 d6 db 95 a5 f6 66 74 ea 81 |
| | 0b 9a 58 58 66 26 86 a6 b4 56 2b 29 43 e5 bb 81 |
| | 74 86 a7 b7 16 2f 07 ec d1 b5 f9 ae 4f 98 89 a9 |
| | 91 7d 58 5b 8d 20 d5 c5 08 40 3b 86 af f4 d6 b9 |
| | 20 95 e8 90 3b 8f 9f 36 5b 46 b6 d4 1e f5 05 88 |
| | 80 14 e7 2c 77 5d 6e 54 e9 65 81 5a 68 92 a5 d6 |
| | 40 78 11 97 65 d7 64 36 5e 8d 2a 87 a8 eb 7d 06 |
| | 2c 10 f8 0a 7d 01 00 01 10 00 06 40 99 8f 5a 54 |
| | 71 23 a7 6a 64 3f bd dd 52 b2 79 6f 88 26 94 9e |
| | af a4 de 7d 8d 88 10 c8 f6 56 f0 8f 46 28 48 55 |
| | 51 c5 af a1 a9 9d ac 9f b1 26 4b eb 39 ad 88 46 |
| | af bc 61 a8 7b f9 7b 3e e4 95 d9 a8 79 48 51 00 |
| | be a4 b6 96 7f 3d fd 76 a6 b7 bb b9 77 dc 54 fb |
| | 52 9c 79 8f ed d4 b1 bc 0f 7e b1 7e 70 6d fc b9 |
| | 7e 66 9a 86 23 3a 98 5e 32 8d 75 18 54 64 36 dd |
| | 92 01 39 90 b9 e3 af 6f 98 a5 c0 80 c6 2f a1 02 |
| | ad 8d f4 d6 66 7b 45 e5 74 18 b1 27 24 01 1e ea |
| | d8 f3 79 92 e9 03 f5 57 8d 65 2a 8d 1b f0 da 58 |
| | 3f 58 a0 f4 b4 be cb 21 66 e9 21 7c 76 f3 c1 7e |
| | 2e 7c 3d 61 20 1d c5 c0 71 28 2e b7 0f 1f 7a c1 |
| | d3 6a 1e a3 54 34 8e 0d d7 96 93 78 50 c1 ee 27 |
| | 72 3a bd 57 22 f0 d7 6d 9d 65 c4 07 9c 82 a6 d4 |
| | f7 6b 9a e9 c0 6c 4a 4f 6f be 8e 01 37 50 3a 66 |
| | d9 e9 d9 f9 06 9e 00 a9 84 a0 18 b3 44 21 24 a3 |
| | 6c cd b7 0f 31 2a e8 15 b6 93 6f b9 86 e5 28 01 |
| | 1a 5e 10 3f 1f 4d 35 a2 8d b8 54 26 68 3a cd cb |
| | 5f fa 37 4a 60 10 b1 0a fe ba 9b 96 5d 7e 99 cf |
| | 01 98 65 87 ad 40 d5 82 1d 61 54 a2 d3 16 3e f7 |
| | e3 05 89 8d 8a 50 87 47 be 29 18 01 b7 c3 dd 43 |
| | 23 7a cd 85 1d 4e a9 c0 1a a4 77 ab e7 31 9a 33 |
| | 1b 7a 86 e1 e5 ca 0c 43 1a fa ec 4c 05 c6 d1 43 |
| | 12 f9 4d 3e f7 d6 05 9c 1c dd |

Table E.4

Table E.5 and Table E.6 provide the private keys for receivers R1 and R2.

| | |
|--|---------------------|
| | Value in Hex for R1 |
|--|---------------------|

| | |
|-----------------------|---|
| P | ec be e5 5b 9e 7a 50 8a 96 80 c8 db b0 ed 44 f2 ba 1d 5d 80 c1 c8 b3 c2 74 de ee 28 ec dc 78 c8 67 53 07 f2 f8 75 9c 4c a5 6c 48 94 c8 eb ad d7 7d d2 ea df 74 20 62 c9 81 a8 3c 36 b9 ea 40 fd |
| Q | be 00 19 76 c6 b4 ba 19 d4 69 fa 4d e2 f8 30 27 36 2b 4c c4 34 ab d3 d9 8c d6 b8 0d 37 5e 59 4b 76 70 68 2b 1f 4c 3d 47 5f a5 b1 cd 74 56 88 fe 7c f8 3b 30 6f fd c3 ed 87 3c a1 53 84 c3 d2 7f |
| d mod (p-1) | 60 71 9b e9 e8 f3 97 1f fe 13 d4 bf 7a a2 0d f6 7b cf 3e aa 17 47 75 c3 7f ec d9 44 9e c9 6a 02 e9 e4 af 56 51 d5 47 a9 09 b2 c5 16 a7 8b 2b 34 a0 33 6e 2f 3d 95 7b e8 ef 02 e4 14 bf 44 28 d9 |
| d mod (q-1) | 10 0e 2e 18 ad 5d e4 43 fe 81 1e 17 aa d0 52 31 5e 10 76 a2 35 d9 37 43 b0 f5 0c 04 81 e3 45 24 6d 53 be 59 b6 81 58 c4 49 3e d5 31 89 5d 2e a2 62 a9 0f 47 5e 8f 51 19 27 4e 66 4b 8a 72 89 bd |
| q ⁻¹ mod p | 3e 53 0a f4 8e 75 e1 52 c6 24 e9 f7 bb ac 3f 22 5f e8 e0 79 35 ff 91 ee 22 56 d2 00 68 32 c4 e1 5f ff f8 b1 1d ee dc 57 81 d1 ab 8b 37 22 e3 9f d0 a1 c1 ce 1d d0 24 23 a0 0e f7 a6 db a3 ea d3 |

Table E.5

| | Value in Hex for R2 |
|-----------------------|---|
| P | f5 f6 fa 44 a2 16 2f a7 1f 7f 16 05 99 26 c4 1b 80 7f fa 52 4e 3e aa 3d 1e b0 f1 9a c6 3d 8f 57 2b 9e cd e8 03 d6 f3 91 75 e2 19 44 9e 11 58 5f d6 88 7c c4 c1 5b 45 9b 84 cf 72 1d 35 bf 24 d5 |
| q | ed ba 08 bf 42 2c 0e fa 3a c4 d2 c7 01 51 25 ae b0 a1 cc db 67 9b aa 50 f0 80 ac 4b 9f 5c ba 1e f4 7f a9 b3 21 8b 62 2c 36 da cd a7 4d a4 d6 44 ed b1 34 e7 69 10 77 5a 6a ff f5 63 8a 2c 43 09 |
| d mod (p-1) | 61 5a c4 6c 6e 0b 82 09 10 3a 69 29 06 19 85 fd ac ba fb 05 a0 da c4 df 34 4a ad 16 a9 e8 ab d7 c0 f8 36 5f e3 45 2d 5b 21 e1 c0 46 9c 9a 18 f4 b6 21 87 e1 08 f7 6b 71 c6 fb a5 1b 52 ae b9 91 |
| d mod (q-1) | 5a 83 7f bb 1a bd dd c2 06 c8 54 1c b3 72 ab 2f 55 4f 75 c9 80 2c 73 ef b7 72 b6 a7 60 79 14 e0 9e 65 51 3e c4 21 e6 f2 40 bc 94 9b 03 e4 24 35 40 6f 3d 5e 72 d1 73 30 39 17 55 de 5d 88 b6 c9 |
| q ⁻¹ mod p | bc 91 2a 93 6a 8d 24 3c d5 7d 12 3b a3 71 c7 3a f0 64 72 50 7e 18 71 e1 b4 3b 1e fc 38 ca e6 8c 16 51 97 d6 3f 04 ee 23 8b 45 0c 4b 98 36 18 27 29 1b 4d 73 7e e8 b0 1a c7 fb 5c ea 78 d0 6e 97 |

Table E.6

Table E.7 provides the global constant (lc_{128}) used for receivers R1 and R2. Note that the same global constant is used in T1, R1 and R2.

| | Value in Hex for R1 | Value in Hex for R2 |
|----------------------------|--|--|
| Global Constant lc_{128} | 93 ce 5a 56 a0 a1 f4 f7 3c 65 8a 1b d2 ae f0 f7 | 93 ce 5a 56 a0 a1 f4 f7 3c 65 8a 1b d2 ae f0 f7 |

Table E.7

5.4 Authentication Protocol

Table E.8 provides test vectors generated during the authentication protocol between T1-R1 and T1-R2. The values provided in the table are as generated or received on the transmitter (T1) side.

| | Value in Hex for R1 | Value in Hex for R2 |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|
| Authentication and Key Exchange (Without stored k_m) | | |
| r_{tx} | 18 fa e4 20 6a fb | f9 f1 30 a8 2d 5b |

| | | |
|--------------------|--|---|
| | <pre> 50 e5 ff 1f 20 db 59 46 fa 47 c4 ed 12 2e 9e 22 bd 95 a9 85 59 a1 59 3c c7 83 e: 01 00 01 </pre> | <pre> e: 01 00 01 </pre> |
| k_m | <pre> 68 bc c5 1b a9 db 1b d0 fa f1 5e 9a d8 a5 af b9 </pre> | <pre> ca 9f 83 95 70 d0 d0 f9 cf e4 eb 54 7e 09 fa 3b </pre> |
| $E_{k_{pub}}(k_m)$ | <pre> Seed: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F lhash: e3 b0 c4 42 98 fc 1c 14 9a fb f4 c8 99 6f b9 24 27 ae 41 e4 64 9b 93 4c a4 95 99 1b 78 52 b8 55 E_{k_{pub}}(k_m): 9b 9f 80 19 ad 0e a2 f0 dd a0 29 33 d9 6d 1c 77 31 37 57 e0 e5 b2 bd dd 36 3e 38 4e 7d 40 78 66 97 7a 4c ce c5 c7 5d 01 57 26 cc a2 f6 de 34 dd 29 be 5e 31 e8 f 1 34 e8 1a 63 a3 6d 46 dc 0a 06 08 99 9d db 3c a2 9c 04 dd 4e d9 02 7d 20 54 ec ca 86 42 1b 18 da 30 9c c4 cb ac b4 54 de 84 68 71 53 6d 92 17 ca 08 8a 7a f9 98 9a b6 7b 22 92 ac 7d 0d 6b d6 7f 31 ab f0 10 c5 2a 0f 6d 27 a0 </pre> | <pre> Seed: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F lhash: e3 b0 c4 42 98 fc 1c 14 9a fb f4 c8 99 6f b9 24 27 ae 41 e4 64 9b 93 4c a4 95 99 1b 78 52 b8 55 E_{k_{pub}}(k_m): a8 55 c2 c4 c6 be ef cd cb 9f e3 9f 2a b7 29 76 fe d8 da c9 38 fa 39 f0 ab ca 8a ed 95 7b 93 b2 df d0 7d 09 9d 05 96 66 03 6e ba e0 63 0f 30 77 c2 bb e2 11 39 e5 27 78 ee 64 f2 85 36 57 c3 39 d2 7b 79 03 b7 cc 82 cb f0 62 82 43 38 09 9b 71 aa 38 a6 3f 48 12 6d 8c 5e 07 90 76 ac 90 99 51 5b 06 a5 fa 50 e4 f9 25 c3 07 12 37 64 92 d7 db d3 34 1c e4 fa dd 09 e6 28 3d 0c ad a9 d8 e1 b5 </pre> |
| r_{rx} | <pre> 3b a0 be de 0c 46 a9 91 </pre> | <pre> e1 7a b0 fd 0f 54 40 52 </pre> |

| | | |
|-------------------|---|--|
| dkey ₀ | 4f 14 8d 11 dd 49 18 10 6f ab 16 6f f6 fd a6 ed | 2a 04 d7 eb 0a 0b 4e 20 26 45 84 01 1e ab 0a 4a |
| dkey ₁ | b5 02 0c 0d f2 81 ba df e4 19 77 fa d0 ac 61 17 | f9 dc 18 97 e8 ee d8 f9 ec 6a 5d 34 a9 62 02 c9 |
| k _d | 4f 14 8d 11 dd 49 18 10 6f ab 16 6f f6 fd a6 ed b5 02 0c 0d f2 81 ba df e4 19 77 fa d0 ac 61 17 | 2a 04 d7 eb 0a 0b 4e 20 26 45 84 01 1e ab 0a 4a f9 dc 18 97 e8 ee d8 f9 ec 6a 5d 34 a9 62 02 c9 |
| H | 69 e0 ab 21 2f db 57 e6 7e fc 43 76 1a 2c 5c ce 76 c3 65 f1 9b 75 c3 ea c2 d2 77 dd 5c 7e 4a c4 | 4f f1 a2 a5 61 67 c8 e0 ad 16 c8 95 99 1b 1a 21 a8 80 c6 27 39 3f c7 bb 83 ed a7 e5 69 07 a5 dc |
| H' | 69 e0 ab 21 2f db 57 e6 7e fc 43 76 1a 2c 5c ce 76 c3 65 f1 9b 75 c3 ea c2 d2 77 dd 5c 7e 4a c4 | 4f f1 a2 a5 61 67 c8 e0 ad 16 c8 95 99 1b 1a 21 a8 80 c6 27 39 3f c7 bb 83 ed a7 e5 69 07 a5 dc |
| Pairing | | |
| $E_{kh}(k_m)$ | <p>Hash of private = SHA256 hash on concatenation of p, q, d mod (p- 1), d mod (q-1), q⁻¹ mod p i.e. SHA-256(p q d mod (p-1) d mod (q-1) q⁻¹ mod p):</p> <p>k_h: 85 86 c7 b6 6d 9f b3 66 a0 76 0c fb c2 ab 4d 34</p> <p>$E_{kh}(k_m)$: b8 9f f9 72 6a 6f 2c 1e 29 b6 44 8d dc a3 10 bd</p> | <p>Hash of private = SHA256 hash on concatenation of p, q, d mod (p-1), d mod (q-1), q⁻¹ mod p i.e. SHA-256(p q d mod (p-1) d mod (q-1) q⁻¹ mod p):</p> <p>k_h: c6 aa 14 eb b0 35 4d 50 83 f5 de 74 2a 8c 1b a2</p> <p>$E_{kh}(k_m)$: e6 57 8e bc c7 68 44 87 88 8a 9b d7 d6 ae 38 be</p> |

| | | |
|---|--|--|
| <i>m</i> | 18 fa e4 20 6a fb 51 49 3b a0 be de 0c 46 a9 91 | f9 f1 30 a8 2d 5b e5 c3 e1 7a b0 fd 0f 54 40 52 |
| Locality Check | | |
| <i>r_n</i> | 32 75 3e a8 78 a6 38 1c | a0 fe 9b b8 20 60 58 ca |
| <i>L</i> | bc 20 92 33 54 91 c1 9e a4 de 8b 30 49 c2 06 6a d8 11 a2 2a b1 46 df 74 58 47 05 a8 b7 67 fb dd | f2 0f 13 6e 85 53 c1 0c d3 dd b2 f9 6d 33 31 f9 cb 6e 97 8c cd 5e da 13 dd ea 41 44 10 9b 51 b0 |
| <i>L'</i> | bc 20 92 33 54 91 c1 9e a4 de 8b 30 49 c2 06 6a d8 11 a2 2a b1 46 df 74 58 47 05 a8 b7 67 fb dd | f2 0f 13 6e 85 53 c1 0c d3 dd b2 f9 6d 33 31 f9 cb 6e 97 8c cd 5e da 13 dd ea 41 44 10 9b 51 b0 |
| Session Key Exchange | | |
| <i>k_s</i> | f3 df 1d d9 57 96 12 3f 98 97 89 b4 21 e1 2d e1 | f3 df 1d d9 57 96 12 3f 98 97 89 b4 21 e1 2d e1 |
| <i>r_{iv}</i> | 40 2b 6b 43 c5 e8 86 d8 | 9a 6d 11 00 a9 b7 6f 64 |
| <i>dkey₂</i> | bf ed 5a cb 93 28 d4 56 a9 f5 2e 0e f3 36 75 f3 | 45 54 97 7d 85 5d a8 c0 2a de f8 90 95 02 7d 1a |
| <i>E_{dkey(k_s)}</i> | 4c 32 47 12 c4 be c6 69 0a c2 19 64 de 91 f1 83 | b6 8b 8a a4 d2 cb ba ff 53 33 c1 d9 bb b7 10 a9 |
| Authentication with Repeaters | | |
| Upstream Propagation of Topology Information | | |
| <i>Receiver ID₀</i> | 47 8e 71 e2 0f | N/A as R2 is not an HDCP Repeater |
| <i>Receiver ID₁</i> | 35 79 6a 17 0e | |
| <i>Receiver ID₂</i> | 74 e8 53 97 a2 | |
| <i>Receiver ID list</i> | 47 8e 71 e2 0f 35 79 6a 17 0e 74 e8 53 97 a2 | |
| <i>RxInfo</i> <i>RxInfo</i> fields | 02 31 Values in binary | |
| <i>Rsvd</i> | 0000 _b | |
| <i>DEPTH</i> | 001 _b | |
| <i>DEVICE_COUNT</i> | 00011 _b | |
| <i>MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED</i> | 0 _b | |
| <i>MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED</i> | 0 _b | |
| <i>HDCP2_0_REPEATER</i> | 0 _b | |
| <i>DOWNSTREAM</i> | | |
| <i>HDCP1_DEVICE_DOWNSTREAM</i> | 1 _b | |
| <i>seq_num_V</i> | 00 00 00 | |
| <i>V</i> | 63 6d c5 08 4d 6c b1 0e 93 a5 28 67 | |

| | | |
|--|--|--|
| | 0f 34 1f 88 | |
| V' | bc cc 7d 16 e6 bc b9 02 60 08 1d f7 4a b4 5c 8a | |
| Downstream Propagation of Content Stream Management Information | | |
| STREAM_ID | 00 | |
| Type | 01 | |
| seq_num_M | 00 00 00 | |
| StreamID_Type seq_num_M | 00 01 00 00 00 | |
| SHA256(k _a) | 1e 6c 5c a4 40 9a 66 a6 20 96 fe cd fc f3 f6 b0 45 e4 44 6b f5 45 c8 45 2b 4a ee 48 0c 53 c4 dd | |
| M' | dd 26 e9 52 6e 0e 1d 69 c8 84 e4 cc c8 09 aa c7 71 e9 97 b5 61 89 09 6e 4d 94 24 c2 1b 64 58 c6 | |

Table E.8

Table E.9 provides an HDCP 2 facsimile SRM signed with the facsimile DCP LLC key in Table E.2. The SRM revokes Receiver IDs of receivers R1 and R2

| | |
|----------------------|--|
| Receiver IDs revoked | 74 5b b8 bd 04, 8b a4 47 42 fb |
| SRM Version | 00 01 |
| SRM Value | 91 00 00 01 01 00 01 91 00 80 00 00 74 5b b8 bd 04 8b a4 47 42 fb 17 07 e9 ea 61 ad b4 2e 9a 44 a9 1e 44 ba ab 6f 6b 37 27 50 bb 17 8e ad c5 7f e8 f5 21 b4 60 1e 54 80 da 2a 1a 59 f3 9d e3 98 54 43 24 70 ca 83 47 64 2d c6 26 6d 30 05 b4 ee 9b b6 69 a2 f3 7c 7d 13 cf f3 a7 c7 89 ef 50 0d 32 e1 d2 2c d1 b5 46 d6 36 44 25 52 65 06 b6 31 e7 26 d2 5c 1c 17 b7 26 6f 73 e5 8a 6e e9 db 00 27 70 11 bb 75 a0 49 30 ff 38 b3 d8 2d 03 c1 78 50 74 ca 60 aa 32 03 28 8d e4 a1 8c 62 2d f3 61 6c bf a1 9c ab b3 d7 e7 d6 dc 31 f6 74 1a ab c0 9c 6a 0a c2 65 e4 29 bd 4e 22 73 5a 2c c7 75 96 e9 7a 16 a6 70 6b 3c ba 50 60 5a 33 d5 d7 f2 76 5b 5e 2d 45 e2 0e f1 4c 6d 8d cf af 39 23 79 a5 fb ae cb 8f d8 de df db 24 20 52 10 74 ba 42 6f ad bb 3e 3a a5 ce 99 0d ff 41 a6 0f 60 7f ae 05 00 3c 2c f3 ba 5a 86 1b 04 7f 53 e5 e3 68 dc 6b 36 25 73 69 95 5d 15 37 d6 98 d6 6b a8 d0 35 37 2d 2f f1 53 90 aa 32 87 99 3b b7 33 48 0e ce e4 f1 d8 93 51 eb 98 92 e7 2d ac a2 32 fb e1 f9 f1 7d 92 26 37 5d 4c 0c f8 a2 11 4c 2a 49 b6 48 bc cc 44 01 06 cb 74 da 0d 70 fa 06 64 a6 54 e6 7c |

| | Plaintext video data to be encrypted | Video data after encryption at T1 |
|-------------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Line 1, Pixel 1 | R 59 G c0 B 3e | R 96 G 22 B ca |
| Line 1, Pixel 2 | R 9e G e5 B fe | R d0 G 3d B 97 |
| Line 1, Pixel 3 | R 9a G f9 B 19 | R f7 G 56 B 5f |
| Line 1, Pixel 4 | R 5b G 5d B 6c | R 72 G 8f B d4 |
| Line 1, Pixel 5 | R 55 G dc B de | R de G 4f B 7d |
| Line 1, Pixel 6 | R e5 G 87 B 63 | R 81 G bd B 2c |
| Line 1, Pixel 7 | R be G fc B c7 | R 52 G 87 B fc |
| Line 1, Pixel 8 | R a1 G b5 B 65 | R 39 G d4 B b7 |
| Horizontal Blank | | |
| Line 2, Pixel 1 | R 12 G 6b B 14 | R 36 G 30 B 65 |
| Line 2, Pixel 2 | R 06 G 4a B 73 | R f8 G 38 B 43 |
| Line 2, Pixel 3 | R f8 G bb B 15 | R 32 G 17 B d8 |
| Line 2, Pixel 4 | R cc G e6 B 21 | R 03 G fd B e4 |
| Line 2, Pixel 5 | R 87 G 95 B 78 | R db G 36 B 41 |
| Line 2, Pixel 6 | R d2 G 03 B f7 | R c4 G cf B ea |
| Line 2, Pixel 7 | R 62 G 81 B 44 | R 91 G 71 B 28 |
| Line 2, Pixel 8 | R 80 G d8 B 75 | R 7f G 25 B a3 |
| Vertical Blank | | |
| Line 1, Pixel 1 | R 56 G bf B 8a | R 3d G a8 B 58 |
| Line 1, Pixel 2 | R 2c G 26 B 03 | R a5 G 2c B ea |
| Line 1, Pixel 3 | R 88 G 43 B dc | R 77 G 71 B ae |
| Line 1, Pixel 4 | R 1d G db B bd | R 2d G af B 0a |
| Line 1, Pixel 5 | R e6 G 32 B 13 | R 4c G fb B 63 |
| Line 1, Pixel 6 | R 36 G 34 B 24 | R e9 G f7 B c7 |
| Line 1, Pixel 7 | R 48 G 82 B 8f | R cb G 36 B 2f |
| Line 1, Pixel 8 | R 99 G b9 B db | R c7 G 7f B 68 |
| Horizontal Blank | | |
| Line 2, Pixel 1 | R 9c G ac B 7b | R 03 G 94 B ab |
| Line 2, Pixel 2 | R 40 G 11 B d0 | R 22 G 93 B ed |
| Line 2, Pixel 3 | R aa G 3c B e6 | R 76 G 12 B 54 |
| Line 2, Pixel 4 | R e6 G e9 B ac | R df G e7 B a2 |
| Line 2, Pixel 5 | R 7a G d5 B 2e | R 18 G d7 B d0 |
| Line 2, Pixel 6 | R 94 G 1f B 35 | R a2 G 46 B 7f |
| Line 2, Pixel 7 | R a7 G 85 B 64 | R e3 G 5d B 21 |
| Line 2, Pixel 8 | R f7 G 45 B 16 | R 29 G 4a B a8 |

Table E.10